Following the May 2011 raid of Osama Bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan and the May/June 2011 trial of Tahawwur Rana in Chicago, pointed questions began to emerge about the linkages between the Pakistani state—most notably, the Pakistani Army and its Inter-Services Intelligence—and terrorist groups like Al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Harakat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HuJI) and the Indian Mujahideen (IM).
Over the past few months, ISVG analyst Rick Kania has used open source information to detail the Karachi, Pakistan-based “Karachi Project”, a strategy adopted by the Pakistani Army in 2003 whose endgame is to “use terror outfits as a crucial part of a strategic arsenal to bust India’s military and economic might.” [1]
Detailed investigations by Georgetown University’s Dr. C. Christine Fair, ProPublica’s Sebastian Rotella, Indian journalists Praveen Swami, Sandeep Unnithan, Vicky Nanjappa, Animesh Roul and others have helped to expose the troubling ties between Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Pakistan and India-based terrorist groups. Though the Project’s leaders are sheltered by the ISI in Karachi, Pakistan, those actually carrying out the attacks are disaffected Indian Muslims; these youths are trained at militant camps in Pakistan and return home to India, awaiting orders from their handlers. Using Indian nationals to carry out the attacks rather than Pakistanis makes it difficult to implicate Pakistan in these attacks.[2]
The open source information available about the Project comes largely from India-based news organizations, who, as Dr. Fair cautions, have a tendency to blame Pakistani militancy rather than domestic Indian militancy due to the reluctance of Indian officials to acknowledge the issue of domestic terrorism, instead asserting that internal security problems exist because of Pakistan.[3]
Most of the available open source information has allegedly resulted from the interrogation of three militants: David Coleman Headley (aka Daood Gilani), Mohammad Abdul Khwaja (aka Mohammad Amjad) and Salman Ahmed (aka Chhotu). The leaders of the Karachi Project are reportedly Roshan Khan (aka Riyaz Bhatkal), Amir Reza Khan, and Iqbal Bhatkal.[4] The shadowy LeT/ISI/Pakistani Army-linked Sajid Mir (aka Sajid Majid) is also reportedly an important figure in the operation.[5] Other major players in the effort include Dawud Ibrahim, the leader of the LeT affiliated D-Company, HuJI member Yaqub Khan (aka Rasul Party), and IM leader Abdul Subhan Qureshi (aka Tauqeer).
Emanating from Pakistan, the Project has resulted in over a dozen serious attacks on Indian soil, targeting major cities such as New Delhi, Varanasi, Bangalore, Ahmedabad and Mumbai. The death toll resulting from Karachi Project-attributed attacks numbers at least 500[6], with the most deadly attacks occurring in Mumbai on 7/11/2006 and 11/26/2008, respectively.
The Karachi Project is said to be part of the Pakistani Army’s broader Afghanistan-India (Af-Ind) strategy: “Dominate Afghanistan and keep India in check. The training and cross-border infiltration of irregular forces form an important part of this twin-thrust plan.”[7] The ISI, an extension of the Army, maintains “plausible deniability” when using militant groups to attack and distract the economically and militarily superior India. The goal is to prevent further regional expansion by India into places like Afghanistan. Indian reporter Sandeep Unnithan argues that Pakistani reluctance to go after groups like the (Afghan) Taliban and the Haqqani Network, which the Obama administration has deemed to be essential to success in Afghanistan, stems from its desire to use these groups to exert influence in Afghanistan after the American withdraw.[8] In sum, the US Afghanistan-Pakistan (AfPak) strategy being pushed on Pakistan directly conflicts with Pakistan’s pre-existing Af-Ind strategy.
Beyond the obvious and continued threat to the US’s ally and economic partner India, Pakistani state support of terrorism has implications that threaten US national security as well. LeT’s “encirclement” strategy threatens regional stability, as the group has spread its tentacles to Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Maldives, the United Arab Emirates[9] and Afghanistan.[10] A stable Afghanistan, following the withdrawal of NATO forces, hinges upon Pakistani cooperation and willingness to deny safe haven to militant groups operating along the AfPak border.
In the 2010 fiscal year, the US provided about $4.5 billion in aid to Pakistan, and $3.0 billion had been requested for the 2012 fiscal year. [11] Several leaders in Congress have called for a freeze or cessation of this aid while Pakistan’s relationship with terrorism is explored. On July 9, 2011, it was announced that the US would be cutting assistance to the Pakistani military by $800 million or (40%) forty percent.[12]
The visualization below, developed using i2 Analyst’s Notebook, depicts the spider web-like nexus of terror associated with the Karachi Project. A timeline of events linked to the Project is displayed across the top of the chart, and the groups and high- and mid-level operatives involved in the attacks are linked to the events and each other. Each linkage has been carefully sourced, with the number on the line between two entities corresponding to the attached source list.
Please expand or download the image for greater detail:
[1] Narayan, R. (2010, March 28). Karachi Project: A Nefarious Plan to Destabilize India. IN MSN News. Retrieved from http://news.in.msn.com/internalsecurity/news/article.aspx?cp-documentid=3739896&page=0
[2] Unnithan, S. (2010, February 18). The Karachi Project. India Today. Retrieved from http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/articlePrint.jsp?aid=84662
[3] Fair, C. (2010). Students’ Islamic Movement of India and the Indian Mujahideen: An Assessment. Asia Policy, Vol. 9. Retrieved from http://home.comcast.net/~christine_fair/pubs/APX_x_IndiaIslam_111109.pdf
[4] Roul, A. (2010). After Pune, Details Emerge on the Karachi Project and it Threat to India. CTC Sentinel. Retrieved from http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/after-pune-details-emerge-on-the-karachi-project-and-its-threat-to-india
[5] Shekhar, S. (2011). The Karachi Project. The Pioneer. Retrieved from http://www.dailypioneer.com/227128/The-Karachi-Project.html
[6] Unnithan, S. (2010, February 18). The Karachi Project. India Today. Retrieved from http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/articlePrint.jsp?aid=84662
[7] Unnithan, S. (2011, May 11). The Pakistan Army’s Af-Ind Strategy. India Today. Retrieved from http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/story/the-pakistan-armys-af-ind-strategy/1/137796.html
[8] Ibid.
[9] Roul, A. (2010). Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Strategy of “Encircling” India. Terrorism Monitor. 8(38). Retrieved from http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37056&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=26&cHash=d907600922
[10] Roggio, B. (2010, July 3). Taliban Commander Linked to Lashkar-e-Taiba Detained in Eastern Afghanistan. The Long War Journal. Retrieved from http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/07/taliban_commander_li.php
[11] Kronstadt, K. (2011, May 6). Direct Overt U.S. Aid Appropriations and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-FY2012. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/pakaid.pdf
[12] Schmitt, E. & Perlez, J. (2011, July 9). U.S. is Deferring Millions in Pakistani Military Aid. New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/10/world/asia/10intel.html?pagewanted=all
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