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


# Al-Qaeda's Second Front:
## Terrorism in Southeast Asia

by Rick Ramos


Sam Houston
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A Member of The Texas State University System

# Institute for the Study of Violent Groups

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# Contents

# Foreword

The following monograph on Islamic terrorism in Southeast Asia, a publication of the Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (ISVG) at Sam Houston State University, is one of a series of publications aimed at providing those interested in terrorism and political violence with a better understanding of the threats of such activities to the world. The lead researcher, Rick Ramos, provides an in-depth analysis of the more active violent groups in Southeast Asia, and an informed description of the impact of radical Islam's involvement in this part of the world.

Of particular interest to the political, law enforcement and military community is an assessment of the rise and threat of radical organizations that were formed or grew from local groups following the Afghan War. The relationships with al-Qaeda, and the involvement of Mujihideen combatants in attacks in the region are documented.

Much of the data presented has been drawn from the ISVG relational database, where Ramos served as Senior Research Analyst. ISVG relies upon open source information, as well as input from a variety of domestic and international sources. Information has also been drawn from the files of the Office of International Criminal Justice (OICJ), which has been collecting data on terrorism for more than 20 years. The development of a relational database in 2003-2004 has enabled ISVG analysts to identify and analyze links between groups and individuals, and is part of an ongoing effort to provide a better understanding of terrorism and political violence in the United States and throughout the world. It is also part of an expanding effort to bring together the criminal justice communities of the world in a common effort to cope with political and extremist violence.

For further information on the activities of ISVG, one can view the website at http://www.isvg.org.

Richard H. Ward
Project Director

# Introduction

On October 12, 2002, the worst international terrorist incident since the September 11 suicide attacks in New York, Washington D.C., and Philadelphia occurred on the island of Bali, claiming the lives of 202 people (Holt, 2004). Before the Bali bombings, the war on terrorism had focused on countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, but now with evidence that the al-Qaeda network is operating and training with radical Islamic groups in Southeast Asia, the focus has shifted to countries in that region (Abuza, 2002).

Since the end of the Afghan War and the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, experts have recognized the political, economic, ethnic, religious, and social instabilities the Southeast Asian region has faced (Tan, 2000). These instabilities, which can be attributed in part to a shift from authoritarian rule toward democracy, and the repercussions of the 1997 Asian economic crisis, have exacerbated corruption within government, police, and military institutions, allowing terrorist organizations to operate and al-Qaeda to infiltrate.

According to Maria Ressa, CNN's lead investigative reporter for Asia, who has lived in the region since 1986, every major al-Qaeda attack since 1993, including the failed assassination attempt of Pope John Paul II, the foiled assassination plan of Bill Clinton, and even the 9/11 attacks, has had a connection to people and terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia (Ressa, 2003). Ressa was one of a few reporters who was able to conduct interviews and obtain qualitative information about terrorist activity and rebels in Southeast Asia because she had direct access to classified intelligence documents and police interrogation reports that provided detailed information about the recent spate of attacks in Southeast Asia.

This monograph provides an understanding of radical Islam, the terrorism-related repercussions of the Afghan War, and the al-Qaeda influence in Southeast Asia, as well as develop a pattern or threat assessment that will aid in future research of the region. This work will also examine the terrorist organizations that formed after the end of the Afghan War in 1989 that have been directly associated with al-Qaeda leaders and members who were veteran Mujihideen fighters

in Afghanistan. In keeping with past research, this study focuses on al-Qaeda-linked groups and members within the ten countries that make up the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Finally, this monograph aims to develop a better understanding of the variables that have allowed terrorism and al-Qaeda to prosper in this region by using related theories, past studies, and analyses of attacks.

Research and analysis for this study was made possible by using the terrorism database compiled by the Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (ISVG) at Sam Houston State University's College of Criminal Justice. The ISVG database provides an up-to-date perspective and prognosis on recent attacks, arrests, court decisions, and new al-Qaeda links from open sources.

Rick Ramos
Research Associate

# Chapter 1

# The Rise of Radical Islamic Terrorism in Southeast Asia

Peter Lance (2003) points out in research examining al-Qaeda-linked terrorist attacks that all roads lead back to Afghanistan and Peshawar in the final days of the Soviet occupation. With the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the al-Qaeda network had plans to expand transnationally by relocating their training camps to an area where they could function financially and recruit, plan, and carry out their attacks effectively (Jones, 2003). Even while the Taliban in Afghanistan provided sanctuary for the al-Qaeda network to conduct terrorist training for members of militant groups from all over the world, the al-Qaeda leaders were already searching for new training bases elsewhere, particularly in Southeast Asia, and more specifically, ASEAN countries (White, 2003).

The al-Qaeda core in itself is actually quite small, with only thirty to forty people within its leadership, but uses the tactic of incorporating other groups from around the world to expand their militant Muslim ideologies (Abuza, 2002). The spread of radical Islam and al-Qaeda to this particular region is of concern, considering twenty percent of the world's one billion Muslims live in ASEAN countries. The majority of the Muslim population resides in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei, with sizable Muslim minorities in the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. With an extensive Muslim population undergoing a painful transition to modernity, the ASEAN region presents itself as a key theater for radical Islam to surge and training camps to develop (Desker, 2002). New camps in Southeast Asia were to provide training not only for al-Qaeda members, but also for radical Islamic groups in Southeast Asia. These groups were to be trained by veterans of the jihad during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (Ressa, 2003).

The call for jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan was highly appealing in Southeast Asia. In the Philippines alone, more than a

thousand Muslims made the trip to Afghanistan. Hundreds more joined them from Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore. When they returned home, they brought back the radical ideas and terrorist techniques they learned in the training camps (Ressa, 2003). Military skills and ideologies from future al-Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan served as the foundation for new Muslim rebel organizations, such as the Kumpulan Militant Malaysia (KMM) in Malaysia, the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which has cells throughout Southeast Asia, and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Philippines. All of these groups have links to the al-Qaeda network (Rabasa, 2001). The emergence of these particular religiously-motivated groups have contributed to the rise of terrorism in a region of the world considered by terrorist analysts to be the perfect breeding ground for recruiting and training new Mujihideen fighters in hopes of turning Southeast Asia into an Islamic state.

The Sipadan Hostage Crisis in the Philippines, the Bali bombings, and the J.W. Marriott Hotel bombing were significant terrorist attacks that caused havoc and fear in Southeast Asia. These attacks were a direct reflection of how radical Islamic groups operate in Southeast Asia.

## What is Islamic Terrorism?

Before the question of terrorism in Southeast Asia can be explored, a definition of terrorism, and specifically Islamic Terrorism, must be established. The concept of modern terrorism is commonly associated with violent actions committed by singular individuals or groups and carried out during times of peace rather than times of war (Merari, 1993). A more comprehensive definition of terrorism is proposed by Alex Schmid (1993):

> *Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual groups or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human targets of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat-and-violence-based communication processes between terrorists (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are*

*used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.*

In addition to the definition above, Schmid points out that all terrorism has a national origin, and international connections or so-called "international terrorism" confusingly subsumes many categories of terrorist activities. Each definition of terrorism prejudices to some extent the area where we look for solutions. So with every different definition of terrorism comes a different typology of why a certain group's activities are considered "terrorist."

This trend, in which several organizations use different definitions to define terrorism and classify groups, has evolved into the separation of these groups into different typologies created by experts to categorize the goals, ideologies, and beliefs of each organization. Although there are universal features that characterize groups moving into terrorism, these features must be tailored to the type of organization, and, within that typology, to the particular region or country involved.

In this study, the typology that will be examined is religious motivated terrorism or, more precisely, radical Islamic Terrorism. Islamic Terrorism is a form of religiously-motivated terrorism where violence is first and foremost a sacramental act or divine duty executed in direct response to some theological demand or imperative (Hoffman, 1998).

## The Genealogy of al-Qaeda

During the 19th and most of the 20th centuries, terrorism in the Muslim and Arab world did not play a significant role because it was more of a localized phenomenon. It existed but was not predominant, nor did it differ essentially in its motivation and outlook from other forms of terrorism. Toward the end of the 20th century, Muslim and Arabic terrorism became the most prominent component of world terrorism. At the present time, radical Islamism is the single most important force in international terrorism, and it will probably remain so for a considerable time to come (Laqueur, 2003).

Spurred by the oil boom of the early 1970s, radical Islam was growing by leaps and bounds (Ressa, 2003). After the price of oil quadrupled, Saudi Arabia poured massive amounts of cash into Southeast Asia, building mosques, madrasas and pesantren spreading the

austere version of Wahhabi Islam and Darul Islam to indoctrinate, propagate, and recruit (Abuza, 2002). The Islamic revolution was led by the Ayatollah Khomeini but only after the Shah of Iran had unwittingly sown the seeds to make it possible.

Following the overthrow of the Shah in 1979, many Muslims around the world envisioned a new world order in which Muslims could depose secular, Western-backed government and replace it with an Islamic state (Ressa, 2003). The jihad in Afghanistan followed and subsequently provided radical Muslims with an enthusiastic belief that it might take only another decade to overthrow the present Arab and Muslim governments and yet another few years to defeat America and the West (Laqueur, 2003).

In the 1980s, Muslim youths traveled from their homes around the world to Afghanistan and enrolled in training camps that taught them guerrilla warfare and arms proficiency. Supported by the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other countries, these fighters waged a vicious jihad against the occupying Soviets (Yom, 2001). The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which began in 1979, was a 10-year war that wreaked havoc and destruction on Afghanistan and elicited a strong reaction from all over the world. The war had far-reaching effects on Afghanistan, the Soviets, and the United States (Abuza, 2002).

After the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, most of the itinerant Muslim guerrillas carried home not only radical Islamic ideas but also the destructive strategies and methods that would characterize a new wave of violence across the Islamic world. They exerted substantial influence in their respective countries. In Algeria, they fueled the violent Islamic Salvation Front. In Yemen, they bolstered the militant ranks of the Islam Reform Party (the USS Cole bombers were two such veterans). They even fought in Bosnia during the Yugoslav civil war (Yom, 2001). In Southeast Asia, they used these radical Islamic ideas to form a network of militancy that was capable of carrying out such attacks as the Bali bombing and J.W. Marriott Hotel bombing in Indonesia.

Long before it was appropriate even to speak of the entity called al-Qaeda or the emergence of Osama bin Laden as its figurehead, Islamists were thinking transnationally. Many of these individuals and groups have been active since the 1980s, and, arguably, long before that, if their thinking is traced back to the work of ideologists like Sayyid Qutb and Osama's own original inspiration, the so-called Emir of Jihad, Abdullah Azzam (Jones, 2003).

In fact, an often neglected point is that long before the end of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, which is often seen as the first intimation of an Islamist internationale (Jones, 2003), Islamist thought was focused on planning over the long term and viewing its resistance as a single, unified global struggle that transcends local, state, and regional concerns (Engel, 2000). This is the rationale that many veteran Mujihideen fighters gained from fighting and ending the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan. This victory in Afghanistan against the Soviets provided confidence for many Muslim fighters who would later be faced with the same circumstances and grievances in their own countries. These grievances provided al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden the franchising opportunity he desired, allowing him to stretch his network into a region that had the highest Muslim population, and where countries were still recovering from the Asian economic crisis in 1997 (Smith, 2002).

## Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was first established on August 8, 1967, in Bangkok, Thailand, with the signature of the Bangkok declaration by the five original member nations: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. In 1984, Brunei was added, and in 1995 Vietnam was added. Laos and Myanmar (Burma) were then added in 1997, and finally, in 1999, Cambodia became its tenth member.

ASEAN's aims and purposes were to be considered a region offering cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, technical, and educational fields with the promotion of regional peace and stability. Over the last thirty years, ASEAN showed progress, but in light of the radical Muslim insurgency, they are currently countries considered sources of refuge and convenience, offering al-Qaeda the space it needs to operate, plan, and conduct training (Abuza, 2002).

But what exactly makes Southeast Asia a fertile ground and source of attraction for al-Qaeda? Some of the attractions that ASEAN countries provide are as follows:

- All of Southeast Asia is awash in weapons. Nearly all of the ASEAN countries produce weapons which are traded freely and cheaply, legally and illegally.
- Some countries have weak governments with incompetent and lax intelligence and enforcement operations, offering

an environment of easy access for meetings and areas for training or refuge.

- Most of the areas in the ASEAN region have active trading and banking with the Middle East (Abuza, 2002).

Because of these attractions, the ASEAN region has been considered the "second front" for al-Qaeda.

Furthermore, Zachary Abuza, an Associate Professor of International Politics and the Director of the East Asian Studies Program at Simmons College in Boston, Massachusetts, has noted that in al-Qaeda's quest for globalization, the common denominator for the organization's ability to internationalize is their search for a region that had an unyielding rejection of a modern liberal secular society and the desire to return to fundamentalist Islam with a literal interpretation of the Koran. This was precisely what Southeast Asia offered and one of many reasons why al-Qaeda became a catalyst in this region.

But the main element that drew al-Qaeda to the ASEAN region was the Afghan War against the Soviets. According to Abuza, one cannot underestimate the importance of this. Whether there were 10,000 Indonesians who went to Afghanistan to fight in the jihad or whether there were only 500, the experience was formative. It was the underpinning of the al-Qaeda network around the world that included senior operatives in Southeast Asia, all of whom had been in Afghanistan (Abuza, 2002).

Radical Islam's entry into Southeast Asia after the end of the Afghan War coincided with a growing demand for democracy, which was presumably radical Islam's nemesis. But countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Malaysia were facing the transition from an authoritarian rule to democracy in the late 1980s, with leaders such as Indonesia's Suharto, the Philippines' Marcos, Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew, and Malaysia's Mahatir stepping down. The reason radical Islam grew during democratization is that authoritarian secular governments oppressed it and never gave political "space" to religious elites or religious-based political parties (Abuza, 2002). During these times of sweeping change, the al-Qaeda network saw an opportunity to establish political Islam by using radical means in a region that was rife with chaos and reorganization (Ressa, 2003). The growing appeal of operating transnationally through global networks to undermine the infidel notion of the secular nation-state constitutes the essential ideological link between militant Islam in

Southeast Asia and the franchising of terror operations of Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network (Simon, 2000).

There have been initial successes against radical Islamic terrorism, such as the arrests in Southeast Asia that thwarted planned attacks against U.S. forces and embassies and broke up part of an extensive terrorist ring there. However, the terrorists remain patient, flexible, fanatical, and skilled, and they can take advantage of free societies and areas where governments are unable to maintain law and order (Gershman, 2002).

An estimated 5,000 Islamist recruits from Muslim countries have trained as al-Qaeda operatives in Osama bin Laden's camps in Afghanistan. Many of these individuals returned to their homelands to train new recruits and to establish new cells. Additionally, about 50,000 volunteers from 50 countries passed through al-Qaeda camps during the Afghan jihad against Soviet occupation more than 20 years ago returning home with the radical "jihad mentality" that al-Qaeda imposed (Desker, 2002). For this study, an examination will be conducted on the number of training camps that have been or are currently in operation in the ASEAN region.

The roots of al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia can be traced back to the Philippines in the late 1980s; both the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) reportedly received support from al-Qaeda (Jones, 2003). Because of the lax immigration controls and corruption in the country, the Philippines has been and is currently a major planning site for al-Qaeda missions (Desker, 2002).

The Philippines was seen as a regional hub for financing radical Islamic organizations. Key al-Qaeda leaders such as Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law, Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, as well as Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, and Ramzi Yousef were sent to establish charities and businesses to serve as a major supply source and transit point for weapons and explosives that were provided to other radical Islamic groups in the region. To date, the only documented al-Qaeda linked groups operating in the Philippines that are still active are the MILF, ASG, and a cell of Jemaah Islamiyah called Mantiqi 3.

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) was formed on January 1, 1993, in Malaysia (Indonesia, 2004a). Considered the alleged operational wing in Southeast Asia for al-Qaeda, the JI has as its goal the establishment of a transnational Islamic caliphate (Nusantara Raya) embracing Indonesia, southern Thailand, the southern Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and parts of Australia (Chalk, 2003). The alleged founders of the JI were clerics Abdullah Sungkar and Abu

Bakar Bashir, who was a central figure of Komando Jihad that drew on an earlier era of Islamist thinking of the Darul Islam movement. Bashir was also responsible for establishing the Majelis Mujihideen of Indonesia (MMI) in 1999 and the Kumpulan Mujihideen Malaysia (KMM) (Jones, 2003).

The JI operates very similarly to the al-Qaeda network by employing an operational structure that includes the Regional Advisory Council (RAC). While Bashir served as the group's spiritual leader, Riduan "Hambali" Isamuddin became the chairman of JI's five-member RAC or shura. Beneath the shura were the secretaries and the five-functional sub-shura: Operations, Communications, Security, Finance, and Missionary. The sub-shura also consisted of the four regional commands or mantiqis, which covered (Abuza, 2004):

- **Mantiqi 1**—peninsular Malaysia, Singapore, and southern Thailand
- **Mantiqi 2**—Java and Sumatra (Indonesia)
- **Mantiqi 3**—the Philippines, Brunei, eastern Malaysia, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi (Indonesia)
- **Mantiqi 4**—parts of Australia and Papua (formerly Irian Jaya)

Hambali, a close disciple of Bashir, was allegedly the operations chief for JI and a senior lieutenant of al-Qaeda who acted as the main point of contact among all four mantiqis until he was apprehended in Thailand on August 14, 2003 (Abuza, 2003).

Since the early 1990s, the JI has managed to establish logistical links with pre-existing Islamic militant groups such as Laskar Jihad, Laskar Jundullah, and Laskar Mujihideen. Currently, most of these extremist groups remain in operation with many members still at large. Though several JI operatives have been arrested in the region over the past few years, the group operates similarly to al-Qaeda by quickly replacing arrested leaders, thereby preserving the capability of carrying out planned attacks.

The JI has been implicated in several bombings in Southeast Asia, most notably the Bali and J.W. Marriott Hotel bombings, which have resulted in the arrests of more than 200 JI members as of September 2003, including more than 30 in Singapore, 80 in Malaysia, 80 in Indonesia, 12 in the Philippines, and 8 in Thailand and Cambodia (Abuza, 2004). Several members of JI's leadership council have also been arrested, including Abu Bakar Bashir on April 30, 2004, and

Hambali on August 14, 2003. These arrests are significant considering the JI is not a very large organization. Nevertheless, the group's arrested leaders are easily replaced.

# Chapter 2

# The Contagion Effect of Terrorism in ASEAN Countries

Terrorism is by no means a new phenomenon in Southeast Asia, though, historically, terrorism in ASEAN countries has not been international in scale. The region has long been plagued by local terrorist movements, including communist terrorism, sectarian militancy, separatism, ethnic militancy, and arguably, some state-sponsored terrorism (Hassan, 2003). Ironically there is much less terrorism in, and emanating from, Southeast Asia today than there was in the period from the late 1940s to the end of the Afghan War .

At the end of the Afghan War in 1989, many ASEAN mujihideen fighters returned to their countries with new fighting skills, radical ideologies, and above all confidence in being a part of a successful jihad. These mujihideen fighters shared their ideologies and stories of their experiences with the Muslim populations in their home countries. The sharing of those experiences, in relation to the contagion effect, produced imitative versions of the witnessed action, especially where rewards were anticipated for repeating the behavior (Berkowitz, 1971). The rewards in this instance could be identified as achieving the common goal of all radical Islamic groups that formed after 1989: to achieve in Southeast Asia a pan-Islamic state.

According to Midlarsky, Crenshaw, and Yoshida, the best method of ascertaining the nature of a contagion process is to specify the particular pattern by which it occurs. Most often, such patterns are hierarchical, in which larger, more visible, and generally more respected units are the first to actively engage in a behavior and then the lower-ranked units imitate that behavior (Midlarsky, 1980). The hierarchical pattern in this study can be attributed to al-Qaeda and its transnational acts of terrorism, most notably the 9/11 attacks that were witnessed around the world. As the al-Qaeda arm of Southeast Asia, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) imitated al-Qaeda's behavior by following the 9/11 attacks with the most deadly terrorist attack in Southeast

Asia—the Bali bombings in 2002. JI followed that with the J.W. Marriott Hotel bombing in 2003.

JI is considered an all-channel network with a small center where one cell relies on the strength of others. This is very similar to how the al-Qaeda network operates. In the instance of hierarchical patterns in ASEAN countries, JI is considered more visible and more respected, considering that other radical Islamic groups in the region share the same principles as JI (i.e., relatively flat hierarchies, decentralization and delegation of decision-making authority, and loose lateral ties among dispersed groups and individuals) (Arquilla, 1999).

Considering that JI is an organization with cells operating in many ASEAN countries, the rest of this chapter will focus on the contagion effect that al-Qaeda's hierarchical pattern has had with the formation of radical Islamic groups in ASEAN countries while briefly including the history of terrorist organizations that operated in each country.

## Burma

Burma is a predominately Buddhist country ruled by a military junta. The ruling party is currently fighting several low-intensity conflicts against ethnic insurgents identified as:

- **Karen National Union (KNU)**—established in 1947;
- **Shan State Army (SSA)**—established in 1964; and
- **United Wa State Army (UWSA)**—established in 1989.

Several bombings have taken place in recent years with very little damage or casualties, but no groups have claimed responsibility. The attacks were likely carried out by anti-regime activists (Patterns, 2003). There have not been any recent incidents of international terrorism in the country, but militant Islamists from Burma attended regional meetings of Abu Bakar Bashir's Rabitatul Mujihideen (RM) between 1999 and 2000 (Ramakrishna, 2003).

## Brunei

A tiny country where two-thirds of the 358,000 population consists of ethnic Malays, Brunei is a country that benefits from extensive petroleum and natural gas fields, the source of one of the highest per capita GDPs among the less-developed countries. The country is ruled by a constitutional sultanate and is considered to have one of the highest standards of living. The head of state, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah, is reputedly one of the world's richest persons.

Although Brunei has a Muslim majority population, there have been no reports of terrorism occurring in this ASEAN country. However, the International Crisis Group (ICG) has stated that JI hopes to include Brunei in its plans to turn several countries in Southeast Asia into a pan-Islamic state. As of yet, there have been no reports of terrorist attacks or formation of JI cells in Brunei. One area of vulnerability to an al-Qaeda influence is Brunei's financial system, which is one of the less regulated markets in the region. Weak financial oversight means that Brunei has the potential to become an important financial center for al-Qaeda in the same way the organization uses the poorly regulated United Arab Emirates (Abuza, 2004).

As part of its commitment to help fight terrorism in the ASEAN region, Brunei signed an anti-terror pact in August 2002 that requires ASEAN members to share intelligence, increase police cooperation, and freeze the financial assets of terrorist groups.

## Cambodia

Cambodia has long been recognized as the setting for one of the worst genocides in the 20th century. Under the radical communist leadership of Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge seized power in 1975 and, over four years, killed 1.7 million Cambodians. The communist regime ended in 1979 when Vietnam invaded Cambodia after a series of border confrontations. Pol Pot was later charged with treason but died in April 1998. Currently all of Pol Pot's deputies have died except for his second in command, Nuon Chea, 77. Nuon Chea admitted on January 18, 2004, that he may have made mistakes, but just wanted to free his country.

The Cambodian government and the United Nations agreed in June 2003 to establish a tribunal to try former Khmer Rouge leaders like Nuon Chea, and he may be compelled to face charges. No senior Khmer Rouge member has ever been convicted for the regime's atrocities. Only two top officials, Ta Mok and Kaing Khek Iev, are in jail after being seized by the government in the waning days of the Khmer Rouge guerrilla war, but they have not been convicted (Khmer, 2004).

The Cambodian Freedom Fighters (CFF) emerged in November 1998. The organization's avowed aim was to overthrow the Cambodian government, which they believed was a puppet of Vietnam. With its headquarters in Long Beach, California, the Cambodian Freedom Fighters probably had no more than 100 armed fighters. The CFF has not been involved in any terrorist activity since November

2000, since many members have been captured and faced trial for their involvement in small-scale terrorist activity.

Al-Qaeda was first seen in Cambodia on May 25, 2003, when Cambodian officials arrested five Muslims accused of belonging to a JI cell operating out of the Om al-Qoura, an Islamic school on the outskirts of Phnom Penh, and for receiving $50,000 from al-Qaeda to launch an attack in the region (Abuza, 2004). The Om al-Qoura school was quickly shut down and believed to have laundered several million dollars for al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda also used the school for "significant money transfers" for both itself and for JI (Abuza, 2004). The Muslims arrested were the Om al-Qoura director, Egyptian Esam Mohammad Khidr Ali and two teachers, Thai Muslims Abdul Azi Jahki Chuiming and Muhammad Yalaudin Mading. The other two were identified as Cambodian Sman Ismael and Egyptian Rousha Yasser. Haji Thiming was the conduit for money going to JI cells in southern Thailand and was closely linked to Thai JI members, Maisuri Haji Abdollah, Maisuri Muyahi, Waemahdi Waedao, and Samarn Waekaji, who were arrested in June 2003.

On February 27, 2004, a Cambodian court could not prove any charges against the five Muslims and threw out the terrorism charges. The Cambodian judge essentially ordered the defendants to be held while prosecutors studied the case again and brought new charges, but lawyers argued the men could not be tried because Cambodia has no anti-terrorism laws. The Om al-Qoura School was eventually authorized to reopen on April 29, 2004, under a different name (Penh, 2004).

Apparently, the Cambodian government also recognized that JI's chief of operations, Hambali, had found sanctuary in Cambodia for three months. Inexplicably, authorities arrested only the five Muslims connected to the Om al-Qoura school. Cambodia still remains a vital region as a transit point for money laundering, weapons smuggling, and drug trafficking.

## Indonesia

As a sprawling archipelago of over 14,000 islands, Indonesia has all the characteristics that would make it a hospitable environment for the operation of international terrorist networks. The country has porous borders, weak and dysfunctional government and law enforcement institutions, economic distress, rampant lawlessness and communal strife, unrestrained militias, and a political climate that inhibits government repression of extremists (Rabasa, 2002). These

characteristics make Indonesia one of the most vulnerable regions for the spread of "jihadism." After the end of the war in Afghanistan, the country reportedly became an important base for activities of various radical Islamic groups (Laqueur, 2003).

A radical Islamic movement in Indonesia before the Afghan War was the Darul Islam ("Adobe of Islam") movement, active from 1949-1962. The movement was composed of an Islamic militia led by Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo who was fighting for independence when Indonesia was under Dutch rule. Indonesia's first President, Sukarno, essentially ended the Islamic militia movement after thirteen years of fighting for an Islamic state.

Abu Bakar Bashir, currently JI's alleged spiritual leader, made his first presence in Indonesia in 1971 when he formed the al-Mukmin pesantren (Islamic boarding school) in Pondok Ngruki, Central Java with Abdullah Sungkar. Al-Mukmin would become the same pesantren many radical Islamic rebels would later be linked to.

Komando Jihad was an Islamic militia that formed in 1977 with the help of President Suharto. It was composed of veterans of the Darul Islam movement that were utilized by Suharto as a means of additional militia to help combat the communist threat when Vietnam fell in 1975. The Free Aceh Movement (GAM), led by Hasan di Toro, also emerged around the same time as Komando Jihad operations were underway. The GAM has been fighting for an independent Islamic state in the Aceh province since its formation in 1976. Many of its leaders, including di Toro, have been living in exile in Sweden since Indonesia declared martial law on the Aceh province on May 19, 2003. During a year-long campaign, Indonesian forces killed 2,000 rebels (Indonesia, 2004b). Indonesia later downgraded martial law in the province on May 19, 2004, but still declared the Aceh province to be in a state of emergency.

Before and during the Afghan War, Indonesia was under the authoritarian rule of General Suharto. On March 25, 2004, the anti-graft group, Transparency International (TI), demonstrated in its Global Corruption Report that Suharto abused his political power and hurt the economic development of Indonesia by allegedly receiving $15-35 billion in his 31-year rule, the highest graft revenue of any world leader (Suharto, 2004).

Suharto's corrupt leadership made it difficult for a radical Islamic insurgency to form and expand because he would arrest any members he felt would spread radical ideologies or create a separate Islamic state. But one group did manage to emerge. The Hizb al-Tahir (Party

of Liberation) was a less radical group whose objectives were to perpetuate what it regarded as the true Islamic way of life and, more importantly, to re-establish the khalifah (caliphate), a universal Islamic political entity. The Hizb al-Tahir was able to escape the harsh Suharto regime by making some political and religious compromises with mainstream Muslims (Azra, 2002).

Abu Bakar Bashir and Abdullah Sungkar were not as successful as the Hizb al-Tahir. At the al-Mukmin pesantren, both Bashir and Sungkar were not able to advocate the imposition of sharia law while under Suharto's regime. They were arrested on November 10, 1978, charged with subversion, and sentenced to nine years in prison. But their sentences were reduced on appeal, and they were released in 1982. After their release, they fled to Malaysia. They returned to Indonesia after the fall of Suharto in 1998, which was caused by the 1997 economic crisis that affected all of Southeast Asia.

The economic crisis also triggered the formation of many new radical Islamic groups. Forty million Indonesians lost their jobs due to the crisis, the country was in the process of democratization and was changing rapidly. Political confusion and economic woes created an environment in which many Indonesians were willing to accept radical solutions—solutions which Bashir and Sungkar were offering in their return to the al-Mukmin pesantren at Pondok Ngruki. Zachary Abuza also noted that radical groups began to emerge as a result of the state's failure to provide an adequate secular education. People would send their children to pesantrens, which may or may not have been fundamentalist, but also to madrasas in the Middle East, which were more radical. There was also an enormous amount of Saudi Gulf money flowing into the Wahhabist fundamentalist schools and organizations (Abuza, December 2002).

On January 1, 1993, Jemaah Islamiyah became the first radical Islamic organization to emerge from Indonesia. JI set the hierarchical pattern for other radical organizations that followed, invariably formed and led by veterans of the Afghan War. Some of these are:

- **Majelis Mujihideen Indonesia (MMI)**—Founded in August 2000, the name literally means, "Indonesian Council of Holy Struggle Fighters." The group was founded by Abu Bakar Bashir and Irfan Awwas Suryahardy to serve as a political front for all groups in Indonesia working to establish Islamic law. MMI includes many JI members (Indonesia Backgrounder, 2002).

- **Jamaah al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin Indonesia (JAMI)**—Led by Habib Husen al-Habsyi, the group formed before 1998. Its name suggests its affiliation with Hizb al-Ikhwan al-Muslimoon (The Muslim Brotherhood) of Egypt.
- **Komite Aksi Penanggulangan Akibat Krisis (KOMPAK)**—A Muslim charity established in 1998 under the DDII to assist Muslims affected by natural disasters, conflict, and poverty. The group was organized by JI member Arismunandar, a 1989 alumnus of Pondok Ngruki. Arismunandar was also head of the Solo branch, while Agus Dwikarna (head of Laskar Jundullah) was running the South Sulawesi branch of KOMPAK (Indonesia Backgrounder, 2004).
- **Laskar Jihad**—One of the largest militant organizations in Indonesia, the group was founded by Ja'afar Umar Thalib (Afghan veteran). Thalib opened offices in Jakarta, Cirebon, Semarang, Solo, Yogyakarta, Lampung, and Kendari in early March 2000. At its height, Laskar Jihad had branch offices in all 26 of Indonesia's provinces. After the Bali bombing, Laskar Jihad announced that it would disband.
- **Front Komunikasi Ahlu-Sunnah Wal-Jama'ah (FKAS-WJ)**—Political-wing of Laskar Jihad founded in 1998, the group's name reveals its ideological links to Muhammad Abd al-Wahab.
- **Laskar Mujihideen**—An armed militant organization with ties to JI through Abu Bakar Bashir's Pondok Ngruki pesantran.Founded by Agus Dwikarna, the leader of Laskar Jundallah, the group focused on the sectarian conflicts in Ambon and Maluku. Its leader was Haris Fadillah, alias Abu Dza, who was the father-in-law of al-Qaeda's Omar al-Faruq. He was killed and succeeded by Aryanto Aris. In 2000, the group numbered 500 men.
- **Laskar Jundullah**—Lead by Agus Dwikarna and believed to have set up the Poso camp for JI training. Agung Hamid is the commander, and Hisbullah is his deputy. The group was formally set up in Makassar in September 2000 as the security force of the Committee to Prepare for the Upholding of Islamic Law. It quickly established branches across South and Central Sulawesi and began to recruit people to fight in Poso.
- **Islamic Defenders' Front (FPI)**—Founded on August 17, 1998, the FPI was led by Habib Muhammad Rizieq bin

Hussein Syihab. The group had become notorious for attacking bars and nightclubs in Jakarta or places its members considered to be immoral. They were also known to target establishments that failed to pay protection fees to the police (Ressa, 2003).

- **Laskar Khos**—Formed within JI and directed by Zulkarnaen (Afghan veteran), alias Arif Sunarso, this group was an elite operations unit composed of 10-15 members who were skilled in bomb-making and prepared to carry out suicide attacks (Go, 2003).

It is difficult to obtain exact figures concerning the demographic distribution of these groups as well as which ones are still operating. Indications are that their memberships are small but well-organized, vocal, visible, and militant. But their membership is certainly much smaller than the 58 million belonging to the two moderate organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. This means that almost 31% of Indonesia's 188 million Muslims are members of these moderate organizations (Ricklefs, 2002), while the vast majority of Indonesia's Muslims are not members of any organization. This majority of Muslims who practice Islam as part of their everyday lives could be susceptible to joining a radical organization if their economic needs are not met by the government's fragile economy.

Since the overthrow of Suharto in 1998, Islamic extremism has emerged as an increasingly salient threat in the world's most populated Muslim country. Although the Megawati administration has declared full support for the U.S.-led war on terrorism, Indonesia was reluctant to identify the JI as a terrorist organization simply because the literal meaning of JI translates into "Islamic Community." It was not until after the 2002 Bali bombings that Indonesia decided to take a more direct approach to combating transnational Islamic terrorism, apprehending and sentencing the key people responsible for both the Bali and J.W. Marriott Hotel bombings (Holt, 2004).

## Laos

Laos is home to 5.6 million predominately Buddhist people. Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Laos has been one of the few remaining communist countries in the world and has had difficulty finding its place in a rapidly changing political landscape. Because Laos depends heavily on trade with Thailand, the economy suffered tremendously during the 1997 economic crisis and is still trying to

recover. Considering that Laos is still a big part of the golden triangle, drug trafficking and the fragile economy continue to be issues much larger than terrorism.

Laos has not had any threats or attacks of international terrorism occurring within the country, but there have been attacks of domestic terrorism aimed at destabilizing the authoritarian government. Bombings in the capital city of Vientiane have been common with 14 bombings between 2000 and 2001 in which four were killed and more than 40 injured. No group claimed responsibility for the bombings until October 2003 when the Free Democratic Peoples Government of Laos admitted they were behind them (Explosion, 2004).

On February 9, 2004, another group of Laos dissidents, the Committee for Independence and Democracy in Laos, claimed responsibility for a spate of bombings that occurred in Vientiane on January 8, February 4, and February 6, 2004, claiming the lives of eight people. The group stated that since the people of Laos have no freedom of expression, the attacks were set off to call attention to and demand regime change towards democracy in Laos (German-based, 2004).

Other extremist groups that have operated in the country are the Hmong rebels and the United Lao National Liberation Front (ULNLF). Both groups formed around 1975 and are involved in low-level fighting against the communist government. With domestic terrorist groups still carrying out attacks, especially near the capital, and considering Laos still lacks counterterrorism laws, the country is still vulnerable to international terrorism. However, Laos has continued to support the global war on terrorism by cooperating bilaterally on counterterrorism issues with the U.S. and other nations and multilaterally with the United Nations and the ASEAN.

## Malaysia

Since the radical Islamic surge in Southeast Asia at the end of the Afghan War, the JI has been very active in Malaysia. For many years Malaysia had a policy that allowed all Muslims to enter without a visa. This made the country a frequent meeting place for Muslims dissatisfied with their own governments (Ressa, 2003). Malaysia has the second largest Muslim population, next to Indonesia, which is precisely why JI spiritual leader, Abu Bakar Bashir, found refuge in Malaysia while Suharto was ruling Indonesia. While in Malaysia, Bashir met many future JI leaders, including his operations chief, Riduan Isamuddin, alias "Hambali," who lived next door to him.

By the mid-1990s, JI's structure was finally coming together in Malaysia, which soon after became its operational base. Bashir used the country to spread his radical Islamic ideologies, while Hambali took advantage of Malaysia's favorable business environment to set up front companies such as Green Laboratory Medicine in 1993, Konsojaya in 1994, and Infocus Technology in 1995 (Abuza, 2004).

There are two JI-linked radical Islamic groups that operate in Malaysia, mostly because Malaysia was primarily used for the establishment of madrasas or pesantrens, financial front companies, and meetings. These groups are:

- **Kumpulan Militant Malaysia (KMM)**—Sometimes called the Kumpulan Mujihideen Malaysia, this group was founded by Afghan War veteran, Zainon Ismail, on October 12, 1995. The KMM was dedicated to the establishment of a regional Islamic state and favored the overthrow of the Mahathir government. Nik Adli Nik Aziz, the son of a Malaysian political figure who studied in Pakistani madrasas and received al-Qaeda training in Afghanistan, became its new leader in 1999 (Hill, 2002).
- **Rabitatul Mujihideen (RM)**—This International Mujihideen Association was established by Abu Bakar Bashir in Kuala Lumpur in 1999. The group seeks to facilitate cooperation and share resources in terms of training, procurement of arms, financial assistance, and terrorist operations. RM meetings have allegedly been attended by militant Islamists from Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, and Burma (Ramakrishna, 2003).

In February 2003, Mohammed Jawhar Hassan of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asian Pacific (CSAP) stated that the problem of terrorism in Malaysia cannot be solved without addressing the root causes. While measures have been taken domestically and internationally to combat terrorism, Malaysia has continued its efforts to promote a peaceful, moderate, and democratic brand of Islam in the country. In doing so, Malaysia has ceased its assistance to 500 Islamic religious schools alleged to be abusing religion to promote anti-government sentiment and ideologies of militancy. The government has also been monitoring Malaysian students attending religious schools in Pakistan, where particularly virulent forms of Islam are being taught.

A prime example of this monitoring occurred on November 24, 2003, when Malaysian authorities released 19 people they were holding under the country's Internal Security Act (ISA). The ISA allows the detainment of a terror suspect for up to two years without counsel. Fifteen of those released were allegedly linked to the Brotherhood of al-Ma'unah Inner Power, a mystical Islamic paramilitary sect that mixed Islam with martial arts and taught that followers could become invulnerable to bullets. The group had plans to turn Malaysia into an Islamic state. The four other suspects who were released had been arrested two weeks earlier on their return from Pakistan, where they were allegedly being groomed as militant leaders (Malaysian, 2003).

The ISA also played a part in the arrest of Hambali's younger brother, Rusman "Gun Gun" Gunawan, on September 25, 2003. Gunawan was arrested along with 18 other students when Pakistani authorities conducted raids on Islamic schools in Karachi. Apparently, the students were being sent to Pakistan in order to be groomed as future JI leaders. Gunawan confessed to Indonesian authorities that he had helped Hambali with terrorist operations by sending him $50,000. He was charged with "facilitating terrorism" by an Indonesian court (Jakarta, 2003). Thirteen of the 19 students detained by Pakistani authorities were held under the ISA in Malaysia.

Since May 2001, Malaysia has detained more than 100 suspected terrorists under the Internal Security Act (ISA) (Patterns, 2004). Malaysia has also responded to UN Security Council requirements to prohibit terrorist financing and freeze accounts of named entities.

## Philippines

The Philippines is a country made up of more than 7,000 islands with a population of over 84 million people. As the largest Christian country in Southeast Asia, the Philippines is made up of predominately Roman Catholics (84%), with some Protestants (9%), Muslims (5%), and Buddhists (2%). The Philippine government has engaged in occasional negotiations with Communist and Muslim rebel groups that are currently operating in Metro Manila and the southern island of Mindanao. Nevertheless, rebel activity and armed banditry in certain areas of the Philippines still pose security concerns of potential large-scale terrorist attacks.

In 1986, the Philippine government conducted successful peace negotiations with the former rebel group, Cordillera People's Liberation Army (CPLA). The rebels signed a peace deal with Manila that

provided for integration of its members into the Philippine armed forces. In 2001, President Arroyo signed an administrative order that paved the way for 264 former guerrillas of the CPLA to join the military. This later resulted in the swearing in of 15 communist guerrillas as lieutenants in the Philippine military on February 27, 2004 (Fifteen, 2004). The Arroyo Administration is hoping for the same success of negotiating a peace deal with the Communist rebel group New People's Army (NPA) and the al-Qaeda-linked group, Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its terrorist military arm, the New People's Army (NPA), have remained active throughout the country and have been considered by Philippines National Security Advisor, Norberto Gonzalez, to be the biggest threat to achieving democracy in the Philippines (Official, 2004). The Arroyo Administration has been in peace negotiations with the CPP/NPA, who has been waging a rebellion since 1969, in an effort to halt the increased violence that has erupted since the European Union and U.S. labeled the NPA a terrorist organization and placed the group on the list of international foreign terrorist organizations—a declaration that essentially froze the rebels' foreign bank accounts. The freezing of the organization's bank accounts has driven the NPA to find other means of obtaining funds, most notably stepping up the collection of "revolutionary taxes" and "permit to campaign" fees from candidates seeking to campaign in self-declared areas of influence. Unpaid fees have led to increased violence in NPA areas during election time.

In this year's election, military records show that the NPA has already amassed 2 billion pesos from politicians and candidates (Calumpita, 2004). Camp Crame records show that in the 1995 election, there were 21 violent incidents related to the election. These incidents killed 79 and injured 111. In the 1998 presidential election, the Philippine National Police (PNP) recorded 267 violent incidents with 50 persons killed and 144 wounded. In 2001, there were 269 election-related incidents, which killed 111 and injured 293. Since April 21, 2004, the PNP has recorded 64 election-related incidents, in which 59 people were killed and 127 others were injured (Kaufman, 2004). The Arroyo Administration decided to hold off peace talks with the CPP/NPA in Oslo, Norway, until after national elections on May 10, 2004.

Peace talks have also been put on hold with the 11,900-member MILF until after national elections and will resume in Kuala Lumpur.

Malaysia has offered to mediate the negotiations between the Philippine government and Muslim rebels and made progress when the Arroyo Administration agreed to pull out troops that were occupying the Buliok complex, a stronghold of the MILF. In response, the Philippine government has asked the MILF to cut off all ties with the JI and has sent a team to investigate areas where potential JI members have been training. Several JI members with ties to the MILF have been arrested, but MILF spokesman Eid Kabalu has repeatedly stated that the MILF has no ties with the JI and seeks to make a political peace pact with the Philippine government.

The MILF has also been implicated in setting up financial front companies with other rebel organizations and operating several training camps in southern Mindanao that have been used to train foreign militants. On November 19, 2003, in an interrogation report, Taufek Refke, a JI detainee and the alleged logistics chief of the JI in the Philippines, stated that some 15 to 20 Indonesian JI members were undergoing an 18-month training course in a camp maintained by the MILF in Mt. Cararao in Maguindanao. The camp, according to Refke's report, was named Jabal Qubah and was set up immediately after the government took over Camp Abubakar in 2000, the MILF's largest training camp (Kaufman, 2003).

The MILF's alleged treasurer, Edward Guerra, was also apprehended by Philippine authorities and revealed the financial connection with the JI, admitting to setting up a chemical fertilizing business, Merkat Trading, in 2000 with detained Singaporean, Habibullah Hameed. Hameed was detained in 2002 under the Internal Security Act for his role with the JI. Merket Trading deals with chemical fertilizers and agricultural machinery (Singh, 2004).

With foreign terrorist training and financial links to the JI and other Muslim rebel groups, the MILF has placed itself in a position to become very important to groups that operate throughout the ASEAN region such as the JI, al-Qaeda, and the Abu Sayyaf Group as a means of stabilizing the growth of radical Islamic terrorism.

The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) is an organization that has been in operation since 1991. ASG is reportedly made up of former members of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) who disbanded when they signed a peace pact with the Philippines' Ramos Administration in 1996. Though the ASG has had close ties with al-Qaeda, in the past the ASG has been considered more of a bandit group than a terrorist organization. This is largely due to the kidnapping tactics they use to demand large ransoms for achieving financial resources

rather than Islamic terrorism. But with the recent arrests of several ASG leaders and the Arroyo Administration's crackdown on the group, membership has dwindled to approximately 400 members and allegedly forced the group to revive itself by renaming itself the "Islamic Movement" as part of its return to fundamental roots (Kaufman, 2004). Recent arrests include:

- **Victor Moore Infante**—Arrested in November 2003, he was one of the fugitives most wanted by the United States and was the ASG's main supplier of smuggled firearms.
- **Sonny Boy Hamsain**—Arrested in January 2004, he was an alleged bag-man and henchman for ASG chieftain Khadaffy Janjalani who had a 300,000-peso reward on his head.
- **Michael Pajiji**—Arrested in March 2004, he was an ASG sub-commander who had a 150,000-peso bounty.
- **Said Alah Usman**—Arrested in December 2003 for his involvement in the abduction of at least 41 foreigners from two resorts in the Philippines and Malaysia, he was said to be the right-hand man of the second-in-command of the ASG.
- **Utoh Hapidin (alias Isnorodin Lagayasan)**—Arrested in April 2004, he was believed to be involved in the Dos Palmas kidnapping in 2001. He had a bounty of 1 million pesos.
- **Ghalib Ahmad Andang (alias Kumander Robot)**—Arrested in December 2003, he was a leader of the ASG faction in Sulu who was involved in the abduction of 21 mostly European hostages from a resort in Sabah, Malaysia, on April 23, 2000. The group obtained more than P400 million in ransom for the release of the hostages,
- **Khair Malvan Mundus (alias Ayman)**—Arrested on May 3, 2004, he was the ASG's top finance and logistics officer. He sourced a 50-million peso fund that the Abu Sayyaf used in at least nine bombings in Mindanao and Metro Manila in 2002.
- **Hamsiraji Sali**—Killed on April 8, 2004, he was one of the top five leaders for the ASG. The U.S. had a $1 million bounty on Sali for his involvement in the kidnapping of three Americans three years ago, two of whom were killed.

These arrests have crippled the ASG and forced the al-Qaeda-linked group to recruit Muslim converts in order to replenish its dwindling membership. On April 5, 2004, there were reportedly at least 20

Christians who embraced Islam, calling themselves "Balik-Islam," or the "Rajah Solaiman Movement" (Vargas, 2004). Some of these converts include Walter Ancheta Villanueva, a former broadcaster of a military-run radio station, Redendo Cain Dellosa, the self-confessed bomber of SuperFerry 14, and Mario Barrientos, arrested in March 2004 in Nueva Ecija. Muslim converts have been targeted for recruitment by both al-Qaeda and ASG because they know the lay of the land and can pass very easily as non-Muslims while making contacts and gaining access to local information.

## Singapore

Singapore is one of the very few ASEAN countries to recover economically from its recession after the economic crisis. Singapore has had no recently reported acts of domestic or international terrorism but has continued to arrest JI members who have plotted to carry out terrorist attacks in the past. However, these recent JI arrests have not eliminated the terrorism threat that JI poses in Singapore as well as the entire ASEAN region. The arrest of JI leader, Mas Selamat Kastari, a Singaporean citizen who was allegedly the leader of the JI cell operating in Singapore with plans to hijack a plane and crash it into Singapore's Changi Airport, was a breakthrough in identifying the continuing threat that Singapore faces. Another JI-linked group was revealed when Singaporean authorities arrested Muhammad Arif bin Naharudin, 20, and Muhammad Amin Bin Mohammed Yunos, 20, in October 2003. Both men stated that they were part of a Pakistani JI cell called al-Ghuraba (S'pore, 2003), allegedly set up by Hambali for the purpose of training future JI operatives and leaders.

Despite the arrests, Singapore is still susceptible to the spread of terrorism, most notably because of its thriving economy which allows higher-paid members to donate certain percentages of their income. According to Zachary Abuza, the Singaporean JI cell was the most influential in raising money obtained by donations from JI members and outside supporters. Several of the Singaporean JI members were very wealthy and gave considerable amounts to the organization. Some donated 2% of their salaries in the early 1990s and 5% by the end of the decade. The Singaporean cell used these funds for equipment, operations, and overseas training, as well as donations to the Taliban regime (Abuza, 2004).

## Thailand

The capturing of Riduan "Hambali" Isamuddin on August 11, 2003, in Ayutthaya, Thailand, served as a major blow to both the JI and al-Qaeda. But the presence of radical Islamic terrorism in the predominately Buddhist country has also been seen in the numerous arrests of JI members operating in Thailand, as well as the recent spate of violence that erupted in the Muslim-dominated portion of southern Thailand. It should also be noted that Hambali called a meeting in southern Thailand in 2002 where the initial planning stages were conducted for the Bali bombings (Ressa, 2003).

Thai Prime Minister Thanksin Shinawatra was very reluctant to admit that JI had cells in Thailand until May 16, 2003, when Thai authorities arrested Singaporean Arifin bin Ali, alias John Wong Ah Hung. Later, four Thais were arrested for allegedly planning to bomb U.S. embassies in Australia, Britain, Israel, Singapore, and the United States, as well as popular tourist destinations in Thailand. The four Thais were identified as Maisuri Haji Abdullah, Mayahi Haji Doloh, Waemahadi Wae-dao, who were arrested in June 2003, and Samarn Wakaji, who surrendered in early July in the southern province of Narathiwat (Thailand, 2003).

According to Eric Teo Chu Chow of the *Asia Times*, Prime Minister Shinawatra was reluctant to admit that a radical Islamic terrorist JI cell existed in his country in order to protect Thailand's tourism industry as well as incoming foreign investments (Chow, 2003). Fear of terrorism has hampered the tourist industries of both Indonesia and the Philippines in the wake of the Bali and J.W. Marriott Hotel bombings. Thailand is accustomed to radical Islamic groups operating in the southern region, where Islamic separatists fought a low-key war in the 70s and 80s, and groups such as the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO), Mujihideen Islam of Pattani (MIP), and the Barisan Revolusi Nationale (BRN) have been active in recent years. With the arrest of Hambali, the identification of a JI cell operating in the southern region and radical Islamic groups made up of Afghan veterans, southern Thailand is a region that is highly susceptible to the contagion effect of terrorism.

Chow also states five reasons why southern Thailand is involved in terror activities: (1) the region is known as the underdog of the Thai economy, and development has not effectively reached the almost 6 million Thai's in the region; (2) many young Thai Muslims have been sent to madrasas in the past three decades and embraced the

fiery brand of Wahhabism from Saudi Arabia; (3) this region has been engaged in a subtle war of attrition and hit-and-run operations against symbols of central authority; (4) PM Shinawatra has been fighting a relentless war against drugs in Thailand, and it is conceivable that part of this drug trade is linked to financing terrorist activities; and (5) there are sensitivities with neighboring Islamic Malaysia, where fundamental opposition Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) is clearly building up Muslim strongholds. There is also a need to address the fact that the Saudi Arabia-based Islamic International Relief Organization (IIRO) remains the largest donor to the Thai Muslim communities. Hardly any educational and religious project is untouched by the IIRO, which is part of the Muslim World League. After September 11, the U.S. Treasury froze IIRO funds in the U.S. because of its alleged links to al-Qaeda.

The recent eruption of violence in the southern Muslim provinces of Pattani, Songkhla, Yala, and Narathiwat have led the Thai government to declare martial law in those areas. Some such attacks are as follows:

- January 4, 2004—20 schools were burned down while four Thai soldiers were murdered during an attack on an Army battalion in Narathiwat in which about 60 armed men made off with about 300 weapons;
- February 13, 2004—a Thai Army Sergeant in Narathiwat was killed;
- March 27, 2004—a bomb blast outside a bar in Sungai Kolok, a town on the border with Malaysia, in southern Thailand injured about 30 people;
- March 29, 2004—14 suspected arson attacks occurred almost simultaneously in three districts of Yala and Pattani;
- March 31, 2004—Ten masked men with assault rifles overpowered security guards and stole dynamite, detonators, and ammonium nitrate from a quarry in Yala province; and
- April 29, 2004—on the bloodiest day in the history of Thailand's restive south, 107 Muslim rebels were killed, six wounded, and 17 arrested in a series of battles with troops and police in Yala, Pattani, and Songkhla provinces.

## Vietnam

Vietnam has had no reports of domestic or international terrorism in the country. Vietnam has been described as poor, densely populated, and still recovering from the decades of war that ravaged the country, the loss of financial support from the old Soviet Bloc, and the rigidities of a centrally planned economy (Simonsen, 2000). Because of this, and the fact that the country is predominately Buddhist, the country offers no refuge for training camps, financial support, or recruitment efforts for radical Islamic terrorist groups.

# Chapter 3

# Conditions that Influenced Radical Islamic Terrorism in Southeast Asia

Before the war in Afghanistan in 1979, many of the countries that make up the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) were not accustomed to defending their homeland against radical Islamic terrorists. With ASEAN countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore under authoritarian rule, many of them were not exposed to or jeopardized by radical Islamic ideologies. One of the earliest Islamic movements in Southeast Asia was the Darul Islam movement that took place from 1949-1962 and sought to gain independence for Indonesia while it was under Dutch rule. Many of the radical Muslim veterans of this movement would later use their experiences after the end of the Afghan War to try and incorporate their radical Islamic ideologies when ASEAN countries were moving from authoritarian rule to democracy.

To answer the question why radical Islamic terrorism became so popular and successful in the region, we must examine where radical Islamic teachings have taken place, the terrorist camps that have been in operation, the influence of a radical Islamic organization that is considered the regional arm of al-Qaeda, and the terrorist attacks that have taken place since the end of the Afghan War within the ASEAN region.

## The Influence of Madrasas and Pesantrens

When trying to understand Islamic terrorism, there is a need to differentiate between the religion of Islam and the ideology of "Islamism." The term "Islam" refers to a religion, dating from the beginning of 610 A.D., which is believed to be practiced by more than one billion people worldwide. "Islamism" refers to a 20th century political ideology that transforms certain aspects of Islam that deal with politics, economics, and military affairs into a sustained and systematic program (Pipes, 1998). Proponents of this ideology were

driven by the desire to return to an idealized past of an allegedly "pure Islamic state," where "there can only be a single understanding of what the Qur'an and sunna mean." Several historical figures played prominent roles in the development of Islamism as a political ideology: Maulana Abul A'la Maududi, Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani. But the most influential was an Arab named Muhammad Abd al-Wahab (1703-1792). Al-Wahab's influence eventually resulted in the dominance of Wahhabi Islam in Saudi Arabia, which allowed the formation of groups that would later become the intellectual ancestors of Islamist groups in Southeast Asia.

Wahhabism can be interpreted as a fundamentalist movement calling for the removal of all innovations from Islam. It seeks to make non-Muslim nations Muslim and Muslim nations even more Muslim. Its goal, in short, is Muslim world domination. This is precisely the same goal as Osama bin Laden and radical Muslim cleric, Abu Bakar Bashir, who first seeks to create an Islamic "super-state" that would combine Indonesia, Malaysia, southern Thailand, southern Philippines, Brunei, Singapore, and parts of Australia. But both bin Laden and Bashir went a step further by not only stating their Islamist goals, but identifying the enemy as the liberal Westerners who have suppressed Muslims around the world.

The ideology of radical Islamism is very hostile towards democracy and liberal ideas. Islamists hate liberalism because it separates the state from religion and denies a political role for the clergy. Radical Islamists fear liberal ideas about religion will spread from the West to the Islamic world and will penetrate the Muslim mind. There is also the premise that every Muslim should accept the extremists' interpretation of the Koran. Radical Muslim clerics claim that the Koran offers a way to live and that a proper understanding of the Koran can be achieved only by serious struggle, especially in participation of violence for Islamic ideas (Novikov, 2003).

Abu Bakar Bashir, of Yemeni descent, introduced the austere version of Wahhabism to Southeast Asia in 1971 when he opened a religious boarding school network known as Ponkok Ngruki in Solo, Central Java, with Adbullah Sungkar. The Suharto regime in Indonesia limited Bashir's radical teachings, and he was essentially forced to find refuge in Malaysia where he continued his radical style of Islamism and formed a network of pesantrens. Not until 1998, when Suharto's regime ended, did Bashir return to Pondok Ngruki while maintaining ties with the Malaysian network of pesantrens he created.

The Pesantren, al-Mukmin, was one of the more popular pesantrens where Bashir preached his political radical beliefs. Several Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) members and leaders attended pesantrens within Pondok Ngruki. The International Crisis Group (ICG) revealed the names of other pesantrens that were linked to JI:

- **Al-Muttaqien**—in Central Jepara, Central Java;
- **Dar us-Syahadah**—in Boyolali, Central Java, located in Kedung Lengkong village, Simo district, Boyolali;
- **Pesantren al-Islam**—in Lamongan, East Java;
- **Al-Ikhlas Foundation**—based in Gading, Solo, Central Java, which runs an Islamic University called Mahad Ali al-Ikhlas;
- **Pesantren Hidayatullah**—located in Gunung Tembak, Balikpapan, East Kalimantan, (the network has 127 pesantrens, several of which became places of shelter and transit for JI members at different times);
- **Pondok Pesantren Darul Aman**—located in Gombara (Ujung Pandang), which was tied to the Laskar Jundullah and received funds from KOMPAK and Al Haramain;
- **Pondok Istiqomah**—located in Sempaga, Samarinda;
- **Pesantren al-Ikhlas—**for girls, located in Sedayu Lawas, Brondong subdistrict, Lamongan district, East Java;
- **Pesantren Ibnul Qoyim**—located in Yogyakarta, Java;
- **Al Tarbiyah Luqmanul Hakiem**—Mukhlas, a graduate of Bashir's Pondok Ngruki school, would become principal of this school in Johor Bahru, Malaysia but the school was shut down by Malaysian authorities in 2002 after a ten-year run; and
- **Sekolah Menengah Arab Darul Anuar**—located in Kota Baru.

Bashir used these pesantrens as the first line of recruitment, utilizing the confidence and experience of returning Mujihideen fighters and promoting the ideology that democracy in ASEAN countries was a result of the Western enemy's influence. The madrasas and pesantren proved to be great recruiting tools for radical Islamic clerics such as Bashir and Sungkar who used the schools to lure young "jihadists" to join their fight to turn Southeast Asia into a pan-Islamic homeland.

## Terrorist Training Camps Operating in ASEAN Region

Once young Islamic believers were enticed to join the cleric's radical cause, the leaders sent them to be properly trained in terror camps where former Afghan veterans taught them the same fighting skills that brought them victory in the Afghan jihad against the Soviets. The victory in Afghanistan provided a boost in confidence for the Mujihideen fighters who trained at military camps run by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, who was a strict proponent of Wahhabi Islam with close links to Saudi Arabia and its logistics operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan—the same camps run by Osama bin Laden (Symonds, 2003).

One of the more important spin-offs from the Afghan War was the creation of a military base in Afghanistan run by Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. This military base was composed of an intricate complex of training camps that provided training in weapons, explosives, and urban warfare to potential "jihadis" from all over the world, including Southeast Asia (Desker, 2003).

After the Afghan jihad ended in 1989, the only known Islamic training camp operating in Southeast Asia was Camp Abubakar in the southern Philippines. Camp Abubakar was operated by the secessionist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). At first, the camp was used primarily to train 15,000 MILF members in their fight for an independent Muslim homeland in Mindanao. Because of the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan and the close relationship with MILF leader Hashim Salamat, JI leader Abdullah Sungkar made a decision to set up training facilities in Mindanao. Sungkar had the leader of JI's Mantiqi 3, Mohammed Nasir bin Abbas, alias Solaiman, set up a training camp within the Abubakar complex.

By 1994, with the help of al-Qaeda, JI was able to establish its own training camp. Camp Hodeibia was established in a remote corner of the sprawling Abubakar complex, near the border of Lanao del Sur (Jemaah, 2003). Camp Hodeibia, used primarily by JI, grew quickly. By 1996, JI had established its barracks, administrative offices, mess hall, and training center within the camp. Between 1996 and 1998, "over one thousand Indonesian Mujihideen were trained at Camp Hodeibia" (Ressa, 2003).

In 1998, the MILF began to expand its training facilities to accommodate al-Qaeda members after the bombing of the U.S. embassies in East Africa. U.S. and Pakistani authorities began cooperating to cut off access to Afghanistan for al-Qaeda operatives,

making it more difficult for them to use Pakistan as a transit point to get to Afghan training camps. It was at this point that Osama bin Laden contacted MILF leader Hashim Salamat and asked the MILF to set up alternative training camps. The MILF soon set up Camp Palestine, an exclusive Arab facility, and Camp Vietnam within the Camp Abubakar complex.

According to interrogation reports on detained JI members who trained at Camp Hodeibia, the regular JI program required three years for training new instructors and six months for regular "cadets." Courses included weapons training, demolition and bombing, map reading, guerrilla and infantry tactics, field engineering, leadership, and self-defense. The religion curriculum provided instruction in basic law, traditions of the Prophet, faith, worship, and jihad (Jemaah, 2003). Several smaller training camps were later set up by the JI inside Camp Hodeibia, as well as in remote areas of Malaysia and Indonesia, that were not only patterned after the al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, but run with al-Qaeda's support and leadership (Ressa, 2003). Some of the other known terrorist camps that operated within the Southeast Asian region were:

- **Camp Solo**—a division of Camp Hodeibia for recruits from Central Java, pure JI with links to both Pondok Ngruki and Pesantren al-Islam;
- **Camp Banten**—a division of Camp Hodeibia for recruits from West Java;
- **Camp Sulawesi**—a division within Camp Hodeibia,
- **Camp Bushra**—the second largest MILF camp located with the Abubakar complex in Lanao del Sur;
- **Camp Abdurajak**—measures 20 by 40 miles, deemed impenetrable by the Red Cross, one of nine ASG camps in the jungle, and the only way to get there is via a 45 minute boat ride from Zamboanga City;
- **Camp Poso**—located in Poso, on Sulawesi east of Jakarta, set up by Agus Dwikarna and used by Laskar Jundullah and JI; and
- **Camp Bogor**—used by Laskar Jihad.

Before a major Philippine military offensive in 2000, the MILF ran Camp Abubakar and dozens of other camps in Mindanao. This ended when the Philippine army overran Camp Abubakar. The MILF agreed to enter peace talks with the government and signed a truce. It is unknown if any terrorist camps are still operating within the

region, but according to Rohan Gunaratna at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies in Singapore, an admission by a JI operative on January 22, 2004, stated that 19 Indonesian nationals had just completed a year-long terrorist training school in the southern Philippines and have already returned to Indonesia (Alarm, 2004).

## Key Afghan Mujihideen Veterans

### Riduan "Hambali" Isamuddin

Born Encep Nurjaman in Kumpung Pabuaran, sub district Karang Tengah, Cianjur, West Java, on April 4, 1964, Hambali is the second of 11 children of Ending Isomudin (deceased) and Eni Maryani. After attending a madrasa called Manarul Huda, Hambali graduated from Al-Ianah Islamic High School in Cianjur in 1984.

As a teenager, Hambali, became involved in a network of local groups known broadly as Jemaah Islamiyah, which literally translates as "Islamic Community." One of the leaders of the groups at the time was Abu Bakar Bashir. Through these groups Hambali eventually became involved in radical Islamism as a reaction to the religious repression of the Suharto regime throughout the 1970s and 1980s in Indonesia (Hambali, 2003).

In 1985, Hambali sought exile and left for Malaysia where he wanted to find work as a trader. Hambali eventually traveled to Afghanistan where he became a protégé of Abdullah Sungkar and a member of the terrorist group, Kommando Jihad, where he trained and recruited fighters as a Mujihideen guerilla against Soviet occupation. During his three-year tour as a Mujihideen, he met and developed strong ties with Osama bin Laden (Malkin, 2003).

In the early 1990s, Hambali returned to Malaysia, where he married a Chinese Malaysian woman named Noralwizah Lee Abdullah (arrested Aug. 12, 2003) and is believed to have traveled the country recruiting young Muslims to join a jihad with the eventual aim of setting up a pan-Islamic state. Hambali eventually ran a series of classes where he taught students about jihad and encouraged them to create an uprising in Malaysia. This was the first time jihad had ever been heard of in Malaysia. It was also during this time that Hambali established the Luqmanul Hakiem terrorism school with Abu Bakar Bashir in southern Malaysia.

Hambali emerged as JI's chief military strategist in 1999. He assumed control of the Regional Advisory Council (RAC), which acts as the main coordinating body for the four Mantiqis that oper-

ate across Southeast Asia. It was from this position that Hambali is believed to have been an integral part of some of the most audacious and devastating acts of Islamic terrorism to have ever been carried out or planned against Western interests (Novikov, 2003). Some of the attacks that Hambali has been implicated in are:

- **1993**—Provided World Trade Center bombers, Ramzi Yousef and Wali Kahn, with an escape route to Pakistan and cash when they fled to the Philippines after the WTC bombing;
- **1995**—Provided financial and logistical help for "Operation Bojinka";
- **January 2000**—Hosted a meeting in Malaysia with two eventual 9/11 hijackers, Khalid al-Mindhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, as well as a high ranking al-Qaeda figure who organized the bombing of the USS Cole;
- **August 2000**—Car bombing of the Philippine ambassador's house in Jakarta;
- **December 2000**—church bombings in Indonesia and the Philippines;
- **October 12, 2002**—Bali bombings; and
- **August 5, 2003**—J.W. Marriott Hotel bombing.

Because of his alleged involvement in these terrorist attacks, Hambali became the most wanted and most feared man in Southeast Asia until his capture in Ayutthaya, Thailand, on August 14, 2003. Some analysts are hopeful that Hambali may be difficult to replace, but according to Sydney Jones, Indonesia director for ICG, "the problem is that there are a lot of successors." On top of her list was a man named Zulkarnaen (real name Aris Sumarsono) who has been implicated in several bombings and is still at large.

**Jaffar Umar Thalib**

Born in 1961, the seventh of eight children, in East Java, Indonesia, Jaffar Umar Thalib got his start in jihad while fighting for two years alongside the anti-Soviet Mujihideen in Afghanistan in the late 1980s, a period he recalls with obvious affection (Marshall, 2002). In 1987, Thalib met Osama bin Laden in Peshawar, Pakistan. Thalib openly scorns bin Laden as a misguided lightweight, but experts say there is little difference between the two. "He claims to be ideologically opposed to Osama, but his ideology is parallel," says Rohan Gunaratna, a researcher at the Center for the Study of Terrorism and

Political Violence at the University of St. Andrews, Scotland. "They both believe in using violence to achieve their political goals."

On his return to Indonesia, Jaffar Umar Thalib became one of the leaders of the Indonesian Salafi movement, which, like Wahhabism, promoted an apolitical Islam based on a strictly literal reading of the Qur'an and hadith, or the words and the practices of the Prophet Muhammed. Thalib eventually became the founder and leader of Laskar Jihad, the largest and most organized Muslim extremist group in Indonesia. Laskar Jihad reportedly has a membership of more than 10,000 fighters (Ressa, 2003), and was primarily involved in conducting guerrilla-type operations during the sectarian conflicts in Ambon and Maluku against Christians. While maintaining close ties with JI and MMI, Laskar Jihad reportedly received heavy political and financial support from members of the Indonesian military, but the group claims to have no links to al-Qaeda or Osama bin Laden, stating bin Laden "knew nothing about true religion" (Ressa, 2003). Terrorism expert Gunaratna says he believes Jaffar's open contempt for bin Laden is disingenuous. "Publicly, he's against Osama," Gunaratna says, "but privately he has told Muslim leaders that he's willing to send fighters to Afghanistan if Osama requested."

Laskar Jihad was reportedly disbanded after the 2002 Bali bombings. But with the new spate of violence between Christians and Muslims that began on April 25, 2004, Thalib reportedly sent an intelligence team consisting of five experts on weapons, legal issues, communications, socio-political issues, and a doctor to Ambon, Maluku, to monitor situational developments in the area (Laskar, 2004). This gives reason to suspect the group still operates with Jaffar Umar Thalib as its leader.

**Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi**

Born in Madium, East Java, al-Ghozi was a 1989 graduate of Abu Bakar Bashir's Pondok Ngruki Network. His father, Zenuri, served time in prison for alleged links to Komando Jihad in Indonesia. Al-Ghozi was an Afghan veteran who had extensive skills in handling explosives and was JI's chief bomb-maker. Al-Ghozi underwent Islamic studies in Lahore, Pakistan, before reportedly joining Jemaah Islamiyah in 1992. He trained in the use of weapons, including anti-aircraft guns and explosives in an area bordering Pakistan and Afghanistan. Al-Ghozi was also fluent in several languages and allegedly moved effortlessly through Southeast Asia using five passports and always staying in Muslim neighborhoods (Alexander,

2003). Al-Ghozi was also known to have traveled to the Philippines in 1996 and developed contacts with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), later providing the Muslim separatist group with explosives training while also training recruits from Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. Al-Ghozi has been implicated in several bombings that occurred in Southeast Asia, most notably the December 30, 2000, Rizal Day bombing in Manila.

In April 2003, Al-Ghozi was sentenced to 12 years in prison for possession of explosives, but on July 14, al-Ghozi and two Abu Sayyaf members, Omar Opik Lasal and Abdulmukim Edris, vanished from the maximum-security jail (Camp Crame) in Manila, presumably with the help of Philippine officials. Philippine authorities later killed Edris in August and captured Lasal on October 9. Al-Ghozi was later killed by Philippine authorities in a shoot-out on October 13, 2003, five days before President George Bush was scheduled to visit the Philippines.

**Ali "Mukhlas" Gufron**

Born in 1960 in Tenggulun, Lamongan, East Java, Mukhlas was the older brother of Bali bombers Amrozi and Ali Imron. Mukhlas was also an Afghan veteran who became a teacher at Bashir's Pondok Ngruki network after graduating from the pesantren in 1982. In 1987, Mukhlas met Osama bin Laden in Joji, Afghanistan, when the territory came under fierce attack from the Soviets. He met Hambali for the first time that same year.

When Mukhlas returned from the Afghan War in 1989, he went to Malaysia where he married Faridah bin Abbas, the sister of Hashim bin Abbas, another JI member from Singapore. The voice of Abbas was later heard narrating a JI plot on videotape found in Afghanistan in 2001 (Ressa, 2003). Mukhlas opened a pesantren funded by JI called Luqman al-Hakiem pesantren in Johor, where he continued to preach the radical ideologies he learned when he attended Bashir's Pondok Ngruki. He also recruited Imam Samudra, Ali Imron, and Amrozi, the primary Bali bombers.

In April 2001, Mukhlas took over JI's Mantiqi 1 and was tasked by Hambali with planning the Bali bombings (Ressa, 2004). Mukhlas was eventually arrested on December 3, 2003, by Indonesian authorities in the central Javanese town of Solo. On October 2, 2003, Mukhlas was given the death sentence for his leadership role in planning the Bali bombings.

## Significant Terrorist Incidents That Occurred in Southeast Asia since the End of the Afghan War

### 2000 Sipadan Hostage Crisis

On April 23, 2000, the rebel Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), based on Jolo Island in the Philippines, gained national attention when it went on a kidnapping spree, crossing the border into Malaysia and attacking a diving resort in Sipadan. Led by Ghalib Andang, alias Commander Robot, the al-Qaeda-linked ASG managed to kidnap 21 people from seven countries. The hostages included 10 tourists from Germany, France, Finland, Lebanon, and South Africa and 11 resort employees.

In the Sipadan Hostage Crisis, the last western hostage was not released until September 9, 2000, but only after the ASG was given a ransom of $25 million by the Libyan government, who was under pressure from European countries and wanted permission to negotiate and pay the ransom needed in order to set the hostages free. Two years later, the other European countries reimbursed Libya for the expenses that were paid to the ASG in order to free the hostages. In essence, the Sipadan Hostage Crisis, which lasted for five months, was the biggest windfall ever for the ASG.

On December 7, 2003, Ghalib Andang was captured by the Philippine military during an encounter with troops in Indanan, Sulu. Andang is currently being held at Camp Aguinaldo where he is being interrogated and still could face the death penalty for the string of kidnapping and murder charges against him. Throughout the Sipadan hostage ordeal, the Philippine government maintained that it paid no ransom, but intelligence reports have stated that the negotiators for the Sipadan hostages, led by Robert Aventajado, former Philippine presidential adviser on flagship projects, received their share of the ransom. Aventajado has repeatedly denied the allegations and is currently under investigation.

This particular hostage crisis characterizes the threat the ASG poses to the Philippines, as well as the ASEAN region, by portraying the vulnerability of the country, if in fact the government is in collusion with the ASG rebels as they continue to receive support from al-Qaeda.

### 2000 Medan Christmas Eve Bombings

On October 24, 2000, a series of thirty-eight bombs were assembled by the JI network. The following Christmas Eve, the bombs

were delivered to thirty-eight churches or priests in eleven cities (Indonesia, 2002). Not all of the thirty-eight bombs delivered exploded as planned, but the bombs that did work exploded between 8:30 and 10 p.m., with most going off around 9 p.m. Some of the bombs exploded prematurely, killing some of the JI plotters. The coordinated attack killed nineteen people and wounded 120 in selected cities across Indonesia.

**2000 Rizal Day Bombing**

On December 30, 2000, just six days after the Christmas Eve bombings, another series of five bombs exploded in Metro Manila, Philippines, within a span of a few hours, injuring over a hundred people. The worst explosion took place at a Manila commuter train, killing twenty-two people. Another bomb exploded in an open square less than a hundred meters from the U.S. Embassy (Ressa, 2003).

The bombings were eventually blamed on Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). But specifically implicated in the bombings was an MILF rebel named, Mukhlis Yunos, and a JI explosives expert identified as Fathur Roman al-Ghozi. The bombings in Manila were allegedly staged in retaliation for a military offensive that led to the capture of 46 MILF camps earlier that year (Philippine, 2003).

Yunos was arrested in a CIA sting operation on May 25, 2003, and identified as the head of MILF's Special Operations Group (SOG). Philippine authorities also linked Yunos to a series of other bombings in the Philippines that occurred in 2002 and 2003, including the explosions of three of four planted bombs in General Santos City in April 2002 and at the Davao City airport and wharf in March and April 2003.

Fathur Roman al-Ghozi was an explosives expert from Indonesia, who graduated in 1989 from the Pondok Ngruki pesantren, founded by the alleged spiritual leader of JI, Abu Bakar Bashir. After attending an Afghan training camp in 1993, al-Ghozi went to the Philippines in November 1996 and joined a division of Jemaah Islamiyah known as Mantiqi 3. He was later transferred to Mantiqi 1, where he was under the leadership and guidance of Hambali. Al-Ghozi also taught explosives classes at Camp Abubakar and became a key figure in various JI bombing plots because he was able to obtain the explosives for JI (Jemaah, 2003).

Al-Ghozi was arrested on January 15, 2002, by Philippine authorities in Manila and sentenced to seventeen years in prison for carrying 1.2 tons of explosives. But on July 14, 2003, al-Ghozi managed to

escape from Camp Crame Prison in the Philippines, along with two other Abu Sayyaf rebels. On October 12, 2003, al-Ghozi was gunned down and killed by Philippine police in Pigkawayan, North Cotabato. The actions of these two men show how the interests of the MILF, JI, and al-Qaeda have converged and how these groups were able to work together and carry out planned attacks (Ressa, 2003).

**2002 Bali Bombings**

On October 12, 2002, just one year after the devastating 9/11 terrorist attacks, the tourist hot-spot island of Bali was the target of the deadliest terrorist act since the attacks in Washington, New York, and Pennsylvania. Three bombs exploded simultaneously at three separate locations, claiming the lives of 202 people. The first bomb exploded in front of the U.S. Consulate; no one was killed or injured. The second bomb, worn as a vest by a man named Iqbal, exploded at Paddy's Bar. The last bomb, composed of a Mitsubishi L-300 van loaded with explosives and driven by a man called Jimi, caused the most damage.

There was no immediate claim of responsibility for the attacks, but considering that this method of attack is the hallmark of al-Qaeda, Indonesian authorities sought to place the blame on the al-Qaeda linked Jemaah Islamiyah. Despite a slow start on the investigation, Indonesian authorities used forensic experts to restore the chassis number from a part of the Mitsubishi L-300 van found at the blast site in front of the Sari club on Kuta beach. This gave investigators their first lead in identifying who was responsible for the bombings. By cross-referencing the chassis number with the registration number, the police traced the van to its current owner, Amrozi. When police conducted a raid on Amrozi's house in East Java, they yielded incriminating evidence which quickly turned into a confession by Amrozi concerning his involvement in the bombings. In addition to his confession, Amrozi admitted to being a member of JI and identified the "mastermind" behind the attacks, Imam Samudra.

In Samudra's confession, he stated that the bombings were part of their obligations as Muslims toward fellow Muslims who were being oppressed and slaughtered by the American tourists and their allies. He also stated that Bali was picked because there were many places in Bali that were visited by tourists from countries such as the United States, England, France, Australia, Israel, and other countries who behave despotically towards Muslims.

Further evidence revealed that Samudra and members of JI had robbed the "Elita" gold shop in August 2002 to finance the terrorist acts (Harymurti, 2002). But there is also speculation that the money for the bombings was provided in three installments totaling $30,500 by JI treasurer, Wan Min Wan Mat, between March and September 2002 (Four, 2003).

The initial planning of the Bali bombings took place in Bangkok, Thailand, in February 2002 with the gathering of JI leaders, called by Hambali, to discuss the new strategy of hitting soft targets like nightclubs and bars. The JI leaders who attended this crucial meeting were Hambali, Mukhlas, Dr. Azahari Husin (JI's top bomb maker), Noor Din Top (JI administrator), Zulkepli Marzuki (JI financier and aide to Hambali), and Wan Min Wan Mat (JI's treasurer).

One of the more important concerns that came out of the Bali bombings was the effect on the Indonesian economy, particularly damage to Bali's tourism-dependant economy. According to Zachary Abuza, the entire Bali bombing operation required less than $50,000 to plan and execute while dragging Indonesia's economic growth rate down as much as one percentage point, an estimated loss of more than $1 billion in tourist revenue. But Abuza argues that the sustained action against terrorist financing, despite the considerable difficulties, is worthwhile because it limits the "space" that groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah would have availiable to them to plan, train, and carry out attacks (Abuza, 2004).

After an 11-month long trial, thirty-three people were convicted for their involvement in the Bali blasts of October 12, 2002. Most of those convicted were veterans of the Afghan War against the former Soviet Union and former students of Abu Bakar Bashir's Pondok Ngruki pesantren or Islamic boarding school in Solo, Central Java (Indonesia, 2002).

CNN's Maria Ressa stated that the Bali attacks could have been prevented, but because of the government's denial of the existence of radical Muslim terrorists in Indonesia, the terrorists were able to work, plan, and carry out their attacks without interference. The Indonesian police had the names of each of the Bali bombers well in advance, but political courting of moderate Muslims by ignoring extremists had prevented anyone from taking action. The Bali terrorists convicted were identified as:

1. **Amrozi bin Nurhasyim**—found guilty of providing the van and bombs used in the attacks and sentenced to death on August 7, 2003;
2. **Abdul Rauf, alias Sam**—sentenced to 16 years in prison on September 8, 2003, for coming up with the idea to rob the "Elita" jewelry store on Java Island to help finance the Bali bombings;
3. **Andri Octavia, alias Yudi**—sentenced to 16 years in prison on September 8, 2003;
4. **Junaedi, alias Amin**—sentenced to 15 years in prison on September 8, 2003, for robbing the "Elita" jewelry store on Java Island to help finance the Bali bombings;
5. **Andi Hidayet, alias Agus**—sentenced to 15 years in prison on September 8, 2003, for robbing the "Elita" jewelry store on Java Island to help finance the Bali bombings;
6. **Imam Samudra, alias Abdul Aziz**—convicted of planning the attack and described by police as the "field commander," sentenced to death on September 10, 2003;
7. **Makmuri**—given a 7-year prison sentence on September 15, 2003, for hiding Mukhlas;
8. **Ali Imron**—sentenced to life imprisonment on September 18, 2003, and admitted to assembling the main bomb;
9. **Bambang Setiono**—sentenced to 7 years in prison on September 18, 2003, for harboring Bali bombing suspects;
10. **Najib Nawawi**—given a 7-year sentence on September 18, 2003, for providing refuge to three Bali bombing accomplices at his house in Karanganyar, Central Java;
11. **Ahmad Budi Wibowo**—sentenced to 4 years in prison on September 26, 2003, for hiding another terrorist suspect;
12. **Herlambang**, given a 10-year sentence on September 26, 2003, for hiding a key Bali bombing suspect;
13. **Hernianto**—given a 12-year sentence on September 29, 2003, for harboring and assisting Bali bombing terrorists;
14. **Ali "Mukhlas" Gufron**—found guilty of being the coordinator of the attacks and sentenced to death on October 2, 2003;
15. **Hamzah Baya**—given a 6-year prison sentence on October 2, 2003, for helping Ali Imron escape to East Kalimantan after the blast;
16. **Muhammad Yunus**—given a 7-year prison sentence on October 6, 2003, for giving convicted Bali bomber Ali Imron somewhere to hide after the attacks;

17. **Sukastopo**—sentenced to 3 years in prison on October 8, 2003, for hiding information on the whereabouts of suspects sought by police;
18. **Eko Hadi Prasetyo**—sentenced to 4 years in prison on October 8, 2003, for assisting Puriyanto in taking Imron and Mubarok to the island;
19. **Puriyanto**—sentenced to 4 years and 8 months in prison on October 8, 2003, for having helped hide key Bali bombers Ali Imron and Mubarok while they were on the run;
20. **Imam Susanto**—jailed for 56 months on October 15, 2003;
21. **Mujarot**—given a 5-year prison sentence on October 15, 2003;
22. **Sofyan Hadi**—given 6 years in prison on October 15, 2003;
23. **Syamsul Arifin**—given a sentence of 3 years on October 15, 2003, for having known the Bali suspects' whereabouts and hiding key information from authorities;
24. **Sirojul Munir**—given a sentence of 5 years on October 15, 2003;
25. **Mubarok, alias Al Utomo Pamungkas**—given a life sentence on October 16, 2003, for helping assist in sending explosives to Bali and driving the van that was used for the bombing;
26. **Firmansyah bin Edi Harun**—given a 4-year sentence on October 16, 2003, for picking up Ali Imron in Kalimantan while he was on the run from authorities;
27. **Muhajir bin Amin**—given a 4-year prison sentence on October 20, 2003, after he was found guilty of sheltering Bali bombers Ali Imron and Mubarok at a remote farm on the eastern coast of Kalimantan island;
28. **Fajri, alias Yusuf**—the alleged treasurer for JI, went on trial on October 28, 2003, and is being charged for harboring Bali bombing accomplice, Achmad Roichan, and could face up to 20 years if he is found guilty;
29. **Sarjiyo, alias Sawad**—sentenced to life in prison on January 29, 2004, after he was found guilty of mixing the chemicals used in the attack on the Sari club and packing the explosives into the back of the van that was used in the bombing;

30. **Suranto Abdul Ghoni**—found guilty of preparing chemicals for the deadlier of the two bombs and sentenced to life in prison on February 9, 2004;
31. **Heri Hafidin**—sentenced to 6 years in prison on February 12, 2004, for harboring Bali bombing mastermind Imam Samudra;
32. **Abu Rusdan**—the alleged caretaker and leader of JI, found guilty of hiding one of the Bali bombers and sentenced to three and a half years in prison on February 25, 2004;
33. **Achmad Roichan, alias Saad**—the last of the Bali suspects on trial, arrested on April 22, 2003, and given a 9-year prison term on March 4, 2004, for allowing Ali Gufron to stay at his residence on Oct. 17, 2002; and
34. **Idris, alias Jhoni Hendrawan, or Gembrot**—played a logistics role in the attacks and also helped gather funds for the attack. He also detonated the smallest bomb near the U.S. Consulate by mobile phone. Hendrawan's trial has been moved from Bali to Jakarta for his alleged involvement in the Marriott bombing.

The Bali bombings brought a shadowy terrorist organization with tactics, structure, and ideologies similar to the al-Qaeda organization to the forefront of international terrorism and provided a stark warning of Jemaah Islamiyah's abilities and deadly ambitions. The Bali bombings will always serve as a crucial reminder of the vulnerability of Southeast Asia to terrorism.

**2003 J.W. Marriott Hotel Bombing**

On August 5, 2003, at 12:45 p.m. in Mega Kuningan, South Jakarta, a metallic blue Toyota Kijang minivan carried a bomb that exploded in front of the luxury J.W. Marriott Hotel, killing eleven Indonesians and a Dutch banker and injuring 147 other people. The blast left a crater over two meters in diameter and penetrated the 32-centimeter-thick concrete above the basement (Police, 2003).

There was no immediate claim of responsibility for the bombing, but Indonesian authorities blamed the blast on the al-Qaeda linked Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) after al-Qaeda made a statement on August 11, 2003, to al-Qaeda sympathizers and Arab media sites stating, "This operation is part of a series of operations that Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri has promised to carry out." The statement also called the attack "a fatal slap on the face of America and its allies in Muslim Jakarta, where faith has been denigrated by the dirty American presence and

the discriminatory Australian presence." The statement went on to say that the Marriott Hotel was attacked because CIA agents who had been questioning captured Indonesian militants were staying there (Al-Qaeda claims, 2003).

The driver of the minivan was later identified as Asmar Latin Sani, a JI member. His head was found on the fifth floor of the hotel and identified as that of the driver through DNA evidence. Sani was part of an elite special operations team called Laskar Khos. This group consisted of 10-15 JI members who were skilled in bomb making and prepared to carry out suicide terror attacks (Report, 2003). The explosives used in the blast consisted of six plastic boxes, each filled with 19 kilograms of black powder. Around those boxes, the terrorists placed eight plastic cans of gasoline and liquid soap to create a fireball effect. The Marriott bombing was similar to the Bali bombings that occurred almost a year before. Both attacks used the same combination of explosives, with mobile phones used as detonators, and in both cases, the attackers tried to scrape off the identification numbers from the vehicles used (Reenactment, 2003).

Fifteen JI militants have been detained for suspected involvement in the Marriott Hotel bombing. On February 26, 2004, the first suspect was charged in connection with the attack. Sardona Siliwangi, a JI member, received a 10-year prison sentence for having stored explosives later used in the bombing. He was also found guilty of hosting meetings between the bombers at his home in the Sumatran town of Bengkulu. Twenty-eight-year-old Mohammad Rais (alias Edi Indra) was the second JI member to stand trial for his connection in the Marriott hotel bombing. He was accused of introducing the suicide bomber, Asmar Latin Sani, to Dr. Azahari, but has not yet been officially charged. Other JI members who have been detained in connection with the Marriott bombing are:

1. **Tohir** (arrested with Jabir in Padang on Aug. 24, 2003);
2. **Jabir**;
3. **Iqbal** (Malaysian national);
4. **Amran bin Mansyur, alias Andi Saputra** (Malaysian national);
5. **Malikul** (arrested in Pekanbaru, Aug. 12, 2003);
6. **Datuk Rajo Ameh** (arrested in Bekasi, April 29, 2003);
7. **Indra Warman, alias Toni Togar** (arrested in Pekanbaru);
8. **Idris, alias Johni Hendrawan**;

9. **Heru Setianto** (arrested August 9, 2003);
10. **Solichin** (arrested in Dumai); and
11. **Dahlan** (arrested in the East Java town of Ngawi on March 1, 2004).

The J.W. Marriott Hotel bombing showed that even with many of Jemaah Islamiyah's leaders and members detained in connection with Bali bombings a year earlier, JI was still able to conduct operations by quickly replacing captured leadership and members. Like al-Qaeda, JI operates as an "all-channel network" with a small center, which is why combating the group is so difficult. Even though JI operates on a much smaller scale, attacking small targets that are frequented by Westerners, the J.W. Marriott bombing was allegedly funded with $45,000 sent by Hambali and killed primarily Indonesians (Abuza, 2004).

Indonesian police stated that the bomb used in the J.W. Marriott bombing was left over from explosives used in the Christmas Eve attacks and built by the same JI members, Dr. Azahari Husin and Noordin Mohammad Top (alias Dalmatin), both of whom are still at large (Ressa, 2003).

**2004 Manila Bay Superferry 14 bombing**

On February 27, 2004, the 10,000-ton Superferry 14 set sail in Manila Bay with 899 passengers bound for Bacolod in the central Philippines. After an explosion on board, the ferry caught fire and sank, killing almost 100 people. There was no immediate explanation of who was behind the attack until a man identifying himself as Abu Soliman phoned a Philippine radio station, claiming that the Abu Sayyaf Group was responsible. Soliman claimed the explosion was intended as revenge for violence inflicted upon Muslim women by the Philippine military. However, ASG chieftain Khaddafy Janjalani asserted that a suicide bomber described as "Passenger 51" caused the explosion. Janjalani cited "taxes," or the failure of the ship's owners to pay extortion money, as the reason behind the bombing (Garrido, 2004).

"Passenger 51" was not identified by the ASG until Philippine authorities arrested four ASG members on March 30, 2004, averting a terrorist bombing on the scale of the Madrid train bombings that claimed 196 lives earlier that month in Spain. The four ASG members were arrested in separate sweeps in Makati City and Quezon City. Philippine authorities confiscated 36 kilos of TNT, which, according to Philippine President Gloria Arroyo, would have been used to bomb

trains and shopping malls in Metro Manila. During the interrogation of the four arrested ASG members, Redondo Villosa (alias Abil Akhmad Villosa), an explosives expert, claimed responsibility for the Superferry 14 explosion. According to his confession, "Passenger 51" was actually a television set loaded with TNT that he had planted on the ferry, and it was in fact the television that caused the explosion where "Passenger 51" would have been sitting (Torres, 2004).

# Chapter 4

## Al-Qaeda Leaders and Terrorism in Southeast Asia

Key figures of the al-Qaeda network (other than Osama bin Laden) who have contributed to terrorist attacks in ASEAN countries were also responsible for the number of extremist groups that have formed since the end of the Afghan War. Members such as Khalid Shaikh Mohammad, Wali Khan Amin Shah, Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, and Omar al-Faruq were influential members of the al-Qaeda terrorist network that infiltrated the ASEAN region. There they established a financial network that consisted of charities and businesses to support training camps within the region to help train not only al-Qaeda members, but rebels from other radical Islamic groups operating within the region as well.

Since the end of the jihad in Afghanistan in 1989, these particular al-Qaeda members have played a significant role in the development of terrorist operations in a region that is considered susceptible to terrorism.

**Mohammad Jamal Khalifa**

Philippine intelligence sources have stated that Osama bin Laden made his first step towards expanding the al-Qaeda network in Southeast Asia when he sent his brother-in-law, Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, to the Philippines in 1988 to set up a financial network that consisted of charities and Islamic organizations in the region (Ressa, 2004).

In the Philippines, Khalifa worked closely with Abu Sayyaf founder Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani and established all of al-Qaeda's charities and Islamic organizations in areas controlled by the ASG and the MILF. Being of Saudi origin, Khalifa was able to penetrate the local Muslim community because he was married to a Filipina, Jameela (Alice) Yabo, in Mindanao, where he quickly gained acceptance (Desker, 2003).

Many of these charitable Islamic organizations were ostensibly for charity and religious work, but were also used to channel money to the ASG and MILF to fund operations. In fact, on December 23, 1991, Khalifa met with members of Janjalani's ASG at a mosque in

Basilan and gave the group about $1,000 to bomb a church in Jolo. This turned out to be the first terrorist operation of the ASG. On January 29, 1992, Khalifa gave $6,038 to the ASG to carry out two operations: (1) assassinate an Italian missionary, Father Salvatorre Carzedda; and (2) plant a bomb at the Basilan Public Market to disrupt elections in the province. Both of these missions were quickly accomplished (Ressa, 2003).

Perhaps the most important charity that Khalifa established was the International Relations and Information Center (IRIC) run by Abu Omar, Khalifa's brother-in-law. Even though IRIC was involved in several charitable activities, including livelihood projects, job training, orphanages, Islamic schools, and other social work, it also was the primary funding source for Ramzi Yousef's " Operation Bojinka" in 1995.

Khalifa also established four Saudi-based charities that are operating in Southeast Asia:

- Islamic International Relief Organization (IIRO),
- Al Haramain Foundation,
- Medical Emergency Relief Charity (MERC), and
- World Assembly of Muslim Youth.

The al-Haramain Foundation, which was headed by Hidayat Nurwahid was officially taken off the UN Security Council terrorist list of institutions linked to international terrorism on March 12, 2004 (UN, 2004). Although most of the donations to these Islamic charities go to legitimate social work projects, Zachary Abuza states that a significant amount is diverted to terrorist and paramilitary activities. Khalifa did manage to open several branch offices of these Saudi-based charities in ASG and MILF areas, and they were in operation for several years before the Philippine government asserted that these branch offices have been shut down. But according to Abuza, the charities simply changed their names and locations and still remain active to channel funds to extremist groups operating in the Philippines.

In a March 2004 Philippine intelligence report obtained by the Associated Press, another Islamic charity, identified as the Fi Sabilillah Da'wah and Media Foundation, was linked to Khalifa and Osama bin Laden. Apparently the PNP raided the foundation's mosque and office in suburban Quezon City, seizing firearms, explosives, and video-tapes showing jihad activities. The foundation was headed by Ahmad Santos who has been in hiding (Al-Qaeda recruiting, 2004).

Khalifa was known to investigators as Osama bin Laden's "banker" and is believed to be "the real money man" behind the scenes of the 9/11 operation (Lance, 2003). Khalifa was involved in helping finance Ramzi Yousef in several of the terrorist operations he carried out. Of course, one was the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Khalifa was also thought to be responsible for funding Yousef's "Operation Bojinka," as well as the assassination attempt of Pope John Paul II in the Philippines in 1995.

The U.S. gained custody of Khalifa when INS agents arrested him in San Francisco during the Clinton Administration and considered Khalifa an intelligence gold mine. Peter Lance stated that while Khalifa was in custody, U.S. authorities learned he had been convicted of murder in Jordan. But U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher felt that, in light of his criminal conviction in Jordan, having Khalifa in the U.S. would have potentially adverse foreign policy consequences. Once he was deported to Jordan, the murder witness recanted and bin Laden's banker was set free. Khalifa's release was considered to be one of the grievous lapses in intelligence decision making in the years leading up to 9/11 (Lance, 2003).

**Khalid Shaikh Mohammad (KSM)**

Khalid Shaikh Mohammad was born on either March 1, 1964, or April 14, 1965. He is of Kuwaiti descent, but his family is from Baluchistan, a Pakistani province bordering Afghanistan. Khalid Shaikh Mohammad has been described by Maj. Gen. Rashid Qureshi, the media spokesperson of Gen. Pervez Musharraf, as "the kingpin of al-Qaeda" (Raman, 2003) and heralded as a hero to Islam by Pakistan's largest Muslim Party (Al-Qaeda Brain, 2003).

Mohammad learned English while attending Chowan College, a small Baptist college in Murfreesboro, North Carolina, in 1983. He graduated from North Carolina's Agricultural and Technical State University in 1986 with an engineering degree. Subsequently, he went to fight in the Afghan War against the Soviets, but some sources believe he was fighting in the war even before he first arrived in the United States for school (Khalid, 2004). It wasn't until the late 1980s that he moved to Pakistan's northwestern city of Peshawar, where he became acquainted with Osama bin Laden (Al-Qaeda, 2003). Mohammad is also fluent in Arabic, Persian, and his native Urdu, which complemented his changing persona with al-Qaeda over the years as he moved from Karachi to Manila to Islamabad and Qatar (Leaked, 2003).

Mohammad made his first arrival in Southeast Asia in the early 1990s when he went to Manila to meet with other known al-Qaeda members, Wali Khan Amin Shah and his nephew, Ramzi Yousef. While in Manila, Mohammad portrayed himself as a wealthy Saudi businessman and by all accounts lived a very upscale lifestyle, spending a lot of time in scuba diving resorts, enjoying the good life. At the same time, he was working with Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law, Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, in gathering the money to activate al-Qaeda cells and plots in the Philippines (Interview, 2002). This lifestyle enabled Mohammad to use local women to solidify their new identities and establish them as members of the community, a tactic that many members of al-Qaeda have used (Ressa, 2003). Over the years he accumulated up to sixty aliases, including Asraf Refaat Nabith Henan, Khalid abdul Wadood, and Fahd bin Abdellah bin Khalid. In Manila, he was known as Salem Ali, a wealthy plywood exporter who liked to party (Lance, 2003).

Mohammad communicated with his jihadi operatives using codes and encrypted e-mails, even short-wave radio. For instance, a "wedding" in his terminology meant an upcoming event. "Market" was code for Malaysia, "terminal" for Indonesia, and "hotel" for the Philippines, a country he slipped in and out of with ease (Lance, 2003).

In 1996, he was indicted in New York for his alleged involvement in a Philippines-based plot called "Operation Bojinka," a code for the "big bang." The plan involved blowing up 12 U.S.-bound commercial airliners in 48 hours (Ressa, 2003). Mohammad was immediately placed on the 10 most-wanted terrorist list when the plot was uncovered after an apartment fire at the Doña Josefa Apartments in Malate, Philippines. One of the apartments was being rented by Ramzi Yousef. Files recovered from Yousef's laptop linked Mohammad to the plot, and he was indicted on seven counts of terror conspiracy. The U.S. government had offered a $25 million award for information leading to Mohammed's arrest and conviction.

According to al-Qaeda expert Rohan Gunaratna, Mohammad was also involved in the killing of *Wall Street Journal* reporter Daniel Pearl, and stated that "Pearl was going in search of the al-Qaeda network that was operational in Karachi, and it was at the instruction of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed that Daniel Pearl was killed" (Khalid, 2003). Mohammad has also been linked to the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000, Richard Reid's 2001 attempt to blow up an airliner with a shoe bomb, the bombings at the El Ghriba synagogue in Djerba,

Tunisia, and the 2002 Bali bombings in Indonesia. Mohammad is also considered to be the mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks. Gunaratna described Mohammad as a "highly experienced organizer of terrorist attacks across international borders, one of an elite group capable of such events" (Khalid, 2003).

Khalid Shaikh Mohammad was arrested by a joint team of Pakistani and U.S. intelligence officials along with two other al-Qaeda members near the Pakistani capital of Islamabad on March 1, 2003 (Al-Qaeda Suspect, 2003). While the capture of Khalid Shaikh Mohammad promises to yield considerable intelligence, the threat from the worldwide network of cells he directed remains significant (Candid, 2003).

**Wali Khan Amin Shah**

Wali Khan Amin Shah is an ethnic Uzbek from the border town of Miram Shah, located on the western Pakistani frontier between Quetta and Peshawar. He fought alongside bin Laden against the Russians during the Soviet invasion. Shah's legs were deformed from the shrapnel of Soviet mines, and three fingers are missing from one of his hands. Much like Khalid Shaikh Mohammad, Shah used multiple identities such as Osama Turkestani, Osama Asmurai, and Grabi Ibrahim Hahsen and had passports under his own name from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Norway (Lance, 2003).

After the war, Wali Shah went to Manila, Philippines, where he met Carol Santiago (real name Catherine Brioso). Santiago opened a bank account and obtained a pager for Wali Shah, both under her name. After living with Shah for two years and going on many trips together to the beaches in the Philippines, Hong Kong, Bangkok, and Kuala Lumpur where Shah attended to business, she also went with him to the Doña Josefa Apartments in November of 1994. There, she rented the apartment that was later to be used by Ramzi Yousef and Abdul Hakim Murad to build the bombs for "Operation Bojinka," which was foiled when the apartment caught fire and Murad was arrested. When she was picked up by Philippine investigators on January 12, 1995, she said she had no idea her boyfriend was a terrorist (Ressa, 2003).

Wali Khan Amin Shah was initially selected to be the fourth member of the Bojinka cell, along with Yousef, Khalid Shaikh Mohammad and Abdul Hakim Murad (Lance, 2003). After obtaining a bank account, pager, and an apartment, Shah needed to obtain funds in order for Yousef and the Manila cell to become operational. Shah

traveled to Malaysia where he started a front company called Konsonjaya, which exported palm oil and was on the company's board of directors with an Indonesian named Riduan Isamuddin, alias Hambali, the man who was later linked to the 9/11 attacks, Bali bombings, and the J.W. Marriott Hotel bombing.

Wali Khan Amin Shah was arrested in Malaysia in December 1995 after reportedly leading the FBI on a man-hunt through half a dozen countries (Ressa, 2003).

He was charged with seven counts of conspiring and attempting to bomb the 12 planes of "Operation Bojinka" in 1995, which could have killed 4,000 passengers (Jenkins, 1996).

**Omar al-Faruq**

Born in Kuwait on May 24, 1971, Omar al-Faruq admitted to being an al-Qaeda terrorist in confessions he made to the CIA. Intelligence reports of these confessions were later obtained and published by *Time Magazine* on September 15, 2002. Al-Faruq was arrested by Indonesian government agents on June 5, 2002, at a mosque in Bogar, Indonesia, and three days later was deported to the U.S.-held air base in Bagram, Afghanistan, where CIA investigators were interrogating suspected al-Qaeda members. Currently, Omar al-Faruq is being held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

On September 9, 2002, Omar al-Faruq confessed to the CIA that he was in fact al-Qaeda's senior representative in Southeast Asia. But even more shocking in the obtained intelligence reports was al-Faruq's confession to the CIA that two senior al-Qaeda officials, Abu Zubaydah and Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libli, had ordered him to "plan large-scale attacks against U.S. interests in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Cambodia on the first anniversary of 9/11" (*Time*, 2002). Al-Faruq's confessions were obtained only a month before the Bali bombings occurred in Indonesia on October 12, 2003, when he precisely stated that he had plans to carry out large-scale attacks on American interests and, despite his arrest, had backup operatives to assume responsibilities. The attacks were to be carried out by using simultaneous car/truck bomb attacks. Only at this time did the U.S. issue its code-orange terror alert and state that al-Faruq's threatened attacks never occurred on the 9/11 anniversary—instead they occurred one month after the anniversary in Bali.

The confessions of al-Faruq were very helpful in providing key links to al-Qaeda and terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia such

as Jemaah Islamiyah. They also provided important information that detailed al-Qaeda's efforts to establish a base of operations outside Afghanistan and its attempts in recruiting disparate militant groups and criminals into its lethal struggle against the West. Additionally, familiar connections could have also played an important role in building links between al-Qaeda and indigenous militant groups in Southeast Asia. Al-Faruq, was in fact married to the daughter of Haris Fadillah, the leader of Laskar Mujihideen (Murphy, 2003).

Some of the al-Qaeda/Southeast Asia links that were identified with al-Faruq's investigation and confessions were with JI's spiritual leader, Abu Bakar Bashir, in which al-Faruq openly confessed that Bashir planned the 1999 bombing of Jakarta's largest mosque and then blamed Christians for the act. Al-Faruq went on to say that he was the al-Qaeda operative who masterminded the Christmas 2000 bombings of Christian churches in Indonesia. Al-Faruq also had links to Laskar Jundullah leader, Agus Dwikarna, and told the CIA that he in fact helped Dwikarna establish Laskar Jundullah. Other confessions made by al-Faruq that were relevant to Southeast Asia are:

- While al-Faruq was acting as al-Qaeda's Southeast Asia point man, al-Qaeda received financial and operational assistance from JI;
- Based on information obtained from al-Faruq, the U.S. believes Southeast Asia now has the world's highest concentration of al-Qaeda operatives outside Afghanistan and Pakistan; and
- Al-Faruq stated that al-Qaeda's operations in the region were funded through a branch of al-Haramain Islamic Foundation.

# Conclusion

## Implications for the Future

ASEAN countries have made significant strides in eliminating the vulnerability of their countries to terrorist attacks with a number of arrests of terrorist leaders and members who are operating in the ASEAN region. The region has grown to accept the fact that terrorist organizations do in fact exist in their countries, and governments must work together on sharing intelligence and enforcing strict anti-terrorism measures to repel terrorists who have specifically chosen the ASEAN region as a haven for terrorist activity and growth.

While the arrest of such terrorist leaders as JI's Hambali in August 2003 and the arrest of over 200 terrorist members since the 9/11 attacks have proven to mark a success in crippling the leadership of terrorist groups operating in the region, the arrests have failed to decrease the vulnerability and terrorist activity in ASEAN countries. An examination of Sam Houston State University's ISVG database suggests that arrests of terrorist leaders and members may not be enough in winning the war on terrorism in Southeast Asia. The ISVG database shows a total of 546 terrorist related incidents that occurred in ASEAN countries in an eight-month span that included the variables:

- Armed Assault
- Arms Smuggling
- Arrest
- Assets Freeze
- Bombing
- Bounty
- Ceasefire
- Changes in Leadership
- Chemical Terrorism
- Child Recruitment
- Criminal and Civil Court Proceedings
- Communication

- Contraband Smuggling
- Financing
- General Information: Groups and Individuals
- Government Operation
- Police Operation
- Hostage Release
- Kidnapping
- Peace Talks
- Prison Escape
- Political
- Raid
- Search and Seizure
- Shooting
- Splinter/New Group Formation
- Surrender
- Terror Training

While the ASEAN region continues to struggle with the effects of the 1997-98 Asian economic crisis that created a recession within several ASEAN countries, the concern of stabilizing the economy and making a successful transition to democracy with a strong political infrastructure remain primary concerns in successfully combating terrorism. CNN's Maria Ressa stated that there is only one way to win the global war on terrorism: by supporting the moderate Muslims around the world and asking for their help. Ressa made it clear that the U.S. must "ask" and not dictate or demand the help of moderate Muslims who are vulnerable to supporting the radical "anti-Western" ideology al-Qaeda has used to gain support in ASEAN countries.

The economy of several ASEAN countries remains a primary concern for presidential administrations in the Philippines, in which President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo won another 6-year term, and Indonesia, where 2004 elections are taking place. These two nations remain the ASEAN countries with the highest level of terrorist activity. Both countries continue to offer financial growth for al-Qaeda and terrorist organizations to operate. They also offer terrorists the space to train with its porous borders and its unmonitored madrasas and pesantrens.

Zachary Abuza states that shutting down terrorist funding in ASEAN countries is difficult, but far from futile. A strong political will must be present in order for the war on terrorism to be won. The

success of the Philippines and Indonesia in combating terrorism is very important to the rest of the ASEAN countries that are vulnerable to the contagion effect of terrorism.

# Appendix A

## Glossary of Acronyms

| | |
|---|---|
| **ABB** | Alex Boncayao Brigade |
| **ASEAN** | Association of Southeast Asian Nations |
| **ASG** | Abu Sayyaf Group |
| **BIAF** | Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces |
| **BRN** | Barisan Revolusi Nationale |
| **CFF** | Cambodian Freedom Fighters |
| **CPP/NPA** | Communists People's Party/New People's Army |
| **CPLA** | Cordillera People's Liberation Army (CPLA) |
| **DI/TII** | Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia |
| **FKASWJ** | Front Komunikasi Ahlu-Sunnah Wal-Jama'ah |
| **FPI** | Islamic Defenders' Front |
| **GAM** | Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement) |
| **IILF** | Indonesian Islamic Liberation Front |
| **IIRO** | Islamic International Relief Organization |
| **IRIC** | International Relations and Information Center |
| **ISA** | Internal Security Act |
| **ISVG** | Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (Sam Houston State University) |
| **JAMI** | Jamaah al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin Indonesia |
| **JI** | Jemaah Islamiyah |
| **KMM** | Kumpulan Militan Malaysia |
| **KNU** | Karen National Union |
| **KOPASSUS** | Indonesian Army's Special Forces |
| **MERC** | Medical Emergency Relief Charity |
| **MILF** | Moro Islamic Liberation Front |
| **MIP** | Mujihideen Islam Pattani |
| **MNLF** | Moro National Liberation Front |
| **MMI** | Majelis Mujihideen Indonesia |
| **NDF** | National Democratic Front |
| **NGO's** | Islamic Non-Governmental Organizations |
| **NII** | Negara Islam Indonesia |
| **NU** | Nahdlatul Ulama |

| | |
|---|---|
| **PAS** | Parti Islam SeMalaysia |
| **PNP** | Philippine National Police |
| **PULO** | Pattani United Liberation Organization |
| **RAC** | Regional Advisory Council |
| **RM** | Rabitatul Mujihideen |
| **SSA** | Shan State Army |
| **ULNLF** | United Lao National Liberation Front |
| **UWSA** | United Wa State Army |

# Appendix B

# Timeline

**1949 – 1962**

August 7, 1949: Darul Islam rebellion led by Kartosuwirjo operated in Indonesia and was eventually defeated by Sukarno's forces.

**1965**

After a series of massacres, little-known General Suharto, uses the military to suppress a communist coup and deposes Indonesian President Sukarno and stays in power for 32 years.

**1971**

The al-Mukmin Islamic boarding school is established in Pondok Ngruki, Central Java, Indonesia, by Abu Bakar Bashir and Abdullah Sungkar.

The Moro National Liberation Front is formed by Nur Misuari.

**1972**

The Hizb al-Tahrir (Party of Liberation) is introduced in Indonesia.

**1975-1979**

Khmer Rouge regime under leadership of Pol Pot kills 1.7 million Cambodians.

**1976**

Free Aceh Movement is established by Hasan di Toro.

**1977**

Komando Jihad is established and created by Suharto.

## 1978

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is formed by Hashim Salamat.

November 10: Abu Bakar Bashir and Abdullah Sungkar are arrested and charged with subversion and sentenced to nine years in prison, but their sentences were reduced on appeal and they were released in 1982.

## 1982

The MILF officially splits from MNLF.

## 1988

Osama bin Laden sends his brother-in-law, Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, to the Philippines to set up a financial infrastructure of charities and other organizations. (Phase 1)

## 1991

The Abu Sayyaf Group is formed by Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani.

## 1993

January 1: Jemaah Islamiyah is formed.

## 1994

December: Once a financial network is established, bin Laden sends several expert terrorists to the Philippines to set up cells. (Phase 2)

December 11: Ramzi Yousef places a bomb under a seat on Philippines Airlines flight 434, which explodes in flight killing Japanese engineer, Haruki Ikegami.

## 1995

January 6: A fire in apartment #603 rented by Ramzi Yousef and Abdul Hakim Murad at the Doña Josefa Apartments in Manila thwarts "Operation Bojinka."

October 12: Kumpulan Mujihideen Malaysia (KMM) is formed by Zainon Ismail.

## 1996

MNLF signs Peace Agreement with Philippine Government; ARMM is created.

## 1997-1998

The Asian Economic Crisis hits the region.

## 1998

Forum Komunikasi Ahlusunnah Wal Jamaah (FKAWJ) is founded.

February 23: Osama bin Laden issues his fatwa authorizing a war against the U.S. and its allies.

May 21: Suharto ends his rule in Indonesia as a result of May riots in response to the economic crisis.

August: Komite Penanggulangan Krisis, KOMPAK, is founded as an independent arm of the Dewan Dakwah Islam Idonesia (DDII) to address the humanitarian needs arising from the sectarian conflict that erupted in the Malukus in 1998.

August 17: Islamic Defenders' Front (FPI) is formed by Habib Muhammad Rizieq.

December: Phase I of Poso sectarian conflict began that included the burning of Christian homes.

## 1999

Rabitatul Mujihideen is formed as an umbrella organization that unites the leaders of JI with the MILF, Laskar Jundullah, KMM, as well as other Muslim radical groups in the region.

January 19: Religious conflict in Ambon erupts in Indonesia.

October: Abdurrahman Wahid is elected president in Indonesia.

November: JI leader Abdullah Sungkar dies.

## 2000

January: JI and al-Qaeda leaders meet in Kuala Lumpur where they plan the suicide attack on the USS Cole and 9/11 attacks.

April: Phase II of Poso sectarian conflict begins with Muslims damaging Christian communities.

May: Phase III of Poso sectarian conflict breaks out.

August: MMI is founded by Abu Bakar Bashir.

October: Abu Bakar Bashir is arrested and sentenced to four years in prison.

## 2001

January 20: Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo takes office as the 14th president in the Philippines.

May: Laskar Jihad leader, Jaffar Umar Thalib, is arrested by Indonesian authorities.

June: JI member, Abu Jibril, is detained under the Internal Security Act in Malaysia.

July 23: Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri is elected to take the place of embattled President Abdurrahman Wahid.

September 24: President Bush includes Abu Sayyaf among groups targeted in an executive order to freeze financial assets of suspected terrorists.

December: Thirteen members of JI are detained in Singapore.

December 9: Yazid Sufaat, a U.S.-educated biochemist, is arrested in Malaysia.

December 13: Hambali holds a meeting where he orders JI cells to switch to attacks on soft targets in retaliation to JI arrests in Singapore.

December 20: Malino I Accord peace agreement is signed by Muslim and Christian leaders to put a stop to violence in Poso.

## 2002

The Rajah Solaiman Movement is established in the Philippines.

January: Meeting in Bangkok in which Mohammad Mansour Jabarah represents Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in the planning of the Bali bombings.

January 15: Fathur Roman al-Ghozi is arrested in Manila and sentenced to 17 years in prison for possession of 1.2 tons of explosives.

February: Malino II Accord is signed by Muslim and Christian leaders to put a halt to violence in Ambon.

March 13: Laskar Jundullah leader, Agus Dwikarna, is arrested by Philippine authorities for possession of explosives.

June 5: Omar Al-Faruq is arrested in Bogar, West Java, Indonesia and confesses to being "al-Qaeda's senior representative in Southeast Asia."

August: Seventeen members of JI and one MILF member are detained in Singapore.

October: Abu Bakar Bashir, the spiritual leader of JI, is arrested by Indonesian authorities.

October 23: Jemaah Islamiyah is designated a terrorist organization by the UN.

November 5: Amrozi is arrested by Indonesian authorities for involvement in the Bali bombing.

November 21: Abdul Aziz, alias Imam Samudra, alleged field commander of the Bali bombing, is arrested in West Java.

December 3: Ali Gufron, alias Muchlas, another Bali bomber, is arrested.

**2003**

February 2: Mas Slamet Kastari, the head of JI's regional Singaporean cell, is arrested by Indonesian authorities on the Island of Bintan.

April 23: Abu Rusdan, the alleged JI leader who took the place of Abu Bakar Bashir, is arrested.

May 16: Thai authorities arrest Singaporean Arifin bin Ali, alias John Wong Ah Hung, a JI member.

May 19: Indonesia declares Martial Law in Aceh province and begins offensive against GAM rebels.

May 25: Mukhlis Yunos, the head of MILF's Special Operations Group and a key JI link in the Philippines, is arrested in a CIA sting operation.

May 28: Cambodia arrests two Thai Muslims, Haji Thiming Abdul Aziz and Muhammad Jalludin Mading, and an Egyptian, Esam Mohamid Khadir Ali, at the Om al-Qura mosque on suspicions they were plotting a terrorist operation linked to a June regional security meeting to be attended by U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell.

June 10: Three Thais, all of whom were alleged members of JI, and Singaporean Arifin bin Ali planned to bomb an APEC summit that George W. Bush was to attend, along with five foreign embassies in Bangkok and two popular beach resorts in Pattaya and Phuket.

July 11: Indonesian authorities arrest nine JI members, including two senior members.

July 13: MILF leader, Hashim Salamat, dies and is succeeded by Al Hadj Murad Ebrahim.
July 14: Fathur Roman al-Ghozi and two Abu Sayyaf members, Abdul Mukim Ong Edris and Omar Opik Lasal, escape from Camp Crame prison in the Philippines.

July 27: In a failed coup attempt, about 300 Philippine junior soldiers take over the prime commercial complex in Manila's financial district, holding their country hostage for nearly 24 hours after President Arroyo ordered a group of junior military officers arrested for mutiny after they deserted their weapons.

August 7: A Balinese court hands a death sentence to Amrozi, the first of the Bali bombers to hear a verdict.

August 11: Hambali is arrested in Ayutthaya, Thailand.

September 18: Bali bomber, Ali Imron, is sentenced to life in prison for his role in bombings that killed 202 people.

September 20: The younger brother of Hambali, Rusman "Gun Gun" Gunawan, is arrested along with 19 students who were in Karachi, Pakistan, for immigration offenses.

October 2: JI member Taufik Rifki is arrested by Philippine authorities in Cotabato City.

October 2: Bali bomber, Ali "Mukhlas" Gufron, is given the death sentence for his role in the Bali bombings.

October 12: Fathur Roman al-Ghozi is killed by police in Pigkawayan, North Cotabato.

December 7: Ghalib Andang, alias Commander Robot, a senior Abu Sayyaf leader suspected of involvement in the April 2000 kidnapping of Western tourists from Malaysia is captured by Philippine authorities.

**2004**

January 5: Thailand declares martial law in the southern Muslim-majority provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat where 20 public schools were torched and four soldiers were murdered.

February 10: NPA and the Philippine government begin peace talks in Oslo, Norway.

February 16: MILF begins peace talks with Philippine government in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

February 25: Abu Rusdan, the alleged JI caretaker, is sentenced by an Indonesian court to three and half years in prison after being found guilty of hiding one of the men who carried out the Bali bombing in 2002.

March 19: Alkis Asari Alih, alias Abu Jarin, of the Abu Sayyaf Group is arrested in Zamboanga City and admits to participating in the abduction of American, Jeffrey Schilling, a Muslim convert seized in August 2000.

April 8: Abu Sayyaf leader, Hamsiraji Sali, is killed by Philippine authorities on the southern island of Basilan.

April 10: Fifty-three prisoners, including 23 members of Abu Sayyaf, escape from a Philippine prison located on the island province of Basilan.

April 30: Abu Bakar Bashir is rearrested by Indonesian authorities and detained in light of new evidence implicating Bashir as the JI leader, as well as being involved in planning several terrorist attacks.

# Appendix C

## Timeline of Terrorist Attacks in Southeast Asia

### 1999

April 19: The Istiqlal mosque in Jakarta, Indonesia's largest mosque, is bombed injuring five people. This attack was used to start a Muslim-Christian conflict.

### 2000

March 20: The ASG kidnaps 80 students, teachers, and a priest in Basilan.

April 23: Sipadan hostage crisis is carried out by Abu Sayyaf Group, which kidnaps 21 people from seven countries from Sipadan Island, Sempurnah, Sabah.

August 1: On orders from Hambali, Fathur Roman al-Ghozi bombs the Philippine ambassador's house, killing two and injuring 20.

August 28: Abu Sayyaf Group kidnaps American Jeffrey Craig Edward Schilling in Sabah. (He would later be rescued in Luuk, Sulu, on April 12, 2001.)

December 24: Christmas Eve Church bombings kill 19 in Jakarta (Jemaah Islamiyah).

December 30: Rizal Day bombing kills 22 people in Manila, Philippines (Jemaah Islamiyah).

### 2001

May 27: Abu Sayyaf Group kidnaps three U.S. citizens and 17 Filipinos, including Americans Martin and Gracia Burnham.

August 1: Atrium Mall bombing in Jakarta, Indonesia (Jemaah Islamiyah).

## 2002

June 7: Gracia Burnham is rescued by Philippine troops in an operation code-named Operation Daybreak.

October 12: Bali bombings kill 202 people (Jemaah Islamiyah).

October 17: In the Zamboanga bombings, two bombs kill six people and injure 150 in Christian City.

October 18: Manila bus bombing kills three and injures 22.

December 5: Two bombs explode in Makassar, South Sulawesi. One bomb explodes outside a Toyota outlet and the other right outside a McDonald's, killing two people.

## 2003

March 4: Bombing at Davao Airport kills 22 and injures over 100 in Mindanao (MILF).

April 2: Wharf bombing kills 16 and injures 55 in Davao, Mindanao (MILF).

April 28: Pipe bomb explodes at Jakarta Airport (Jemaah Islamiyah).

August 5: J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia, is bombed (Jemaah Islamiyah).

October: Masked gunmen attack Christian villages in Poso, killing 13 villagers and six suspects.

## 2004

January 4: A bomb explodes at a cafe and karaoke lounge in South Sulawesi province, killing four people.

February 27: A home-made bomb hidden inside a television aboard Superferry 14 in Manila Bay explodes killing about 100 people. The bomb had been smuggled on by Redondo Dellosa of the Abu Sayyaf Group.

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